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CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The continuing expansion of liability under the federal securities
laws, and the substantial damages awarded to successful plaintiffs,' have
spawned a proliferation of private damage suits. 2  In turn, increasing
numbers of defendants have filed cross-claims and third-party claims to
eliminate or minimize their liabilities.8 Until recently, insurance4 and
indemnification clauses6 have been the favored means by which poten-
1. When the claims of numerous defendants are joined in a class action, the
imounts can be enormous. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp.
163 (D. Del. 1974); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 362 F. Supp. 771, 778 (D.
Del. 1973) (plaintiff class received $4,000,000 settlement from some defendants plus
judgment'for over $2,000,000 against other defendants); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,525 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiff
class settled with certain defendants for $1,094,000, representing 25 percent of the class'
maximum possible recovery). To assure collection of their potentially large judgments,
plaintiffs often join numerous parties as defendants. E.g., Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F.
Supp. 1099, 1103 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (93 named defendants).
2. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability In-
surance in the Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681 (1969) (address at the
ABA National Institute on "The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability," Sept. 27-28,
1968); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pani Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597,
598 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
3. There were two reported decisions in the 1940's involving third-party claims for
indemnity or contribution: Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1947) and Metzger
v. Breeze Corps., 37 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1941); one unreported decision in the 1950's:
Forbush v. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Civil No. 48-757 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 1952), sum-
marized in 3 L. Loss, SEcURrs RMEGULATION 1739 n.178 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss]; and one in the early 1960's: Handel-Maatschappij H. Albert De Bary
& Co., N.V. v. Faradyne Electronics Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (third-party
complaint). Recently, however, there have been numerous decisions involving either
third-party claims or cross-claims: e.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698
(D.N.J. 1974) (cross-claim); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(both cross-claim and third-party complaint).
4. See Kroll, supra note 2, at 685.
5. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287 n.14 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (issuer-underwriter indemnification agree-
ment); Freund & Hacker, Cutting up the Humble Pie: A Practical Approach to Appor-
t:oning Litigation Among Underwriters, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 461, 472 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Freund & Hacker] (cross-indemnification agreements between issuers
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fial defendants sought to protect themselves against excessive liability.
But insurance has become increasingly expensive and difficult to ob-
tain, 6 while the courts have declined on public policy grounds to enforce
indemnification agreements r Consequently, defendants and potential
defendants are re-examining the common law8 and statutory9 concept of
contribution and its relation to federal securities liability.
Except for underwriter liabilities,10 this recent interest has focused
on the right to contribution absent prior agreement, rather than agree-
ments to distribute potential liabilities.1' It is not uncommon today for
a single securities case to include several cross-claims or third-party
claims for contribution.1 2  Yet the paucity of precedent in this area of
federal securities law' 3 has given the courts little guidance for dealing
with such claims. Courts cannot analogize to legal analysis of contri-
bution claims in other federal actions; except for admiralty,' 4 no such
body of law exists.' 5 Nor is there a unified state approach to which the
and underwriters); Kroll, supra note 2, at 684-85 (cross-indemnification agreements be-
tween corporate officers and directors).
6. See, e.g., Applebaum & McDowell, Indemnification Against Securities Acts Lia-
bilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 131, 137 (Special Issue 1972) (address by Mr. McDowell at the
ABA National Institute on "Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities,"
Oct. 22, 1971).
7. See notes 96-109 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 36-53 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 54-87 infra and accompanying text.
10. To distribute potential underwriter liabilities among all the underwriters of a
public offering, contribution provisions have been included in recent agreements among
the underwriters. See Freund & Hacker 480. For a detailed proposed contribution pro-
vision allocating the risks of litigation among underwriters, see id. 485-95.
11. The usual arena for contesting the contribution right today is the courtroom in
which a securities suit is pending.
12. E.g., B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 166 (D. Del. 1974). Or-
dinarily, these claims appear in conjunction with alternative claims for indemnification.
See, e.g., Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975).
13. See Freund & Hacker 474; Ruder 649.
14. The admiralty rule of equal division of damages in collision cases was adopted
by the Supreme Court in The Catharine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 175 (1854), and ex-
tended to noncollision cases in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S.
106 (1974). In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), the Su-
preme Court replaced the equal division of damages rule in collision cases with a rule
requiing allocation of damages among the parties according to their proportionate
faults. See generally Villareal, Halcyon to Ryan to Weyerhauser to Cooper-Where Do
We Go from Here?, 6 J. MAUTIME L. & CoM. 593 (1975).
15. Some cases flatly state that there is no right of contribution between tortfeasors
under federal common law. E.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir.
Vol. 1975:1153] 1257
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courts can turn. 16 The absence of precedents, however, leaves federal
courts relatively free to choose contribution rules adapted to the securi-
ties setting. To explore some of these rules and the problems they raise
in the special field of securities law, this Note will examine the history of
contribution under federal securities law, the relationship between con-
tribution and indemnity, and the procedural problems encountered in
computing and allocating contribution shares.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER
TIM FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
A. The Contribution Provisions
Both the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)17 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)' contain express provisions for
contribution. It is noteworthy that these provisions appear in the
liability sections under which Congress envisaged joint liability by multi-
ple defendants.' 9 Thus, section 11 of the Securities Act20 subjects
numerous persons to potential liability for a single registration state-
ment; subsection (f) grants a right of contribution to those who are
found liable for payments under the section:
[E]very person who becomes liable to make any payment under this
section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any per-
son who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same
1960); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 403 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (federal rule allows contribution for mid-
air collision). The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1970), has not
created any federal contribution law because the legislative history demonstrated a clear
intent that state contribution rules should govern the rights and liabilities of the United
States. Note, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 123, 135 (1965). Under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970), courts have refused to allow contribution among co-conspirators for payments
in private antitrust suits. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, supra; Sabre Shipping Corp. v.
American President Lines, supra. In the latter case, the court rejected an analogy to
contribution rights under the securities laws. Id. at 1345. See generally Slain, Risk
Distribution and Treble Damages: Insurance and Contribution, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 263,
292-309 (1970); Note, Globus: A Prolific Generator of Nice Questions, 33 OHIo ST.
L.J. 898, 914-17 (1972).
16. See Slain, supra note 15, at 304-05.
17. 15 U.S.C. H9 77a-aa (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970).
19. See 3 Loss 1739-40 n.178.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).Washington University Open Scholarship
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payment, unless the person who has become liable was, and the other
was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. 21
Sections 9(e)22 and 18(b)2 1 of the Exchange Act provide similar rights
to those who become liable under sections 924 and 182C respectively.
26
The legislative history of these sections provides little interpretive guid-
ance beyond establishing that the person from whom contribution is
sought need not have been a party to the original suit." The English
21. Id. § 77k(f).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970):
Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this subsection
may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined
in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment.
23. Id. § 78r(b). For all practical purposes the provision is identical with § 9(e),
quoted in note 22 supra.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970). Section 9 imposes liability for manipulation of securi-
ties registered on the exchanges.
25. Id. § 78r. Section 18 imposes liability for misleading statements in documents
filed under the Exchange Act.
26. Under the express language of § 11(e), a person guilty of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation cannot recovery contribution from any person not guilty of such conduct. This
language is omitted from §§ 9(e) and 18(b), undoubtedly due to the difference in cul-
pability between actions violating §§ 9 and 18 and actions prohibited by § 11. While
I 11 contemplates liability for mere negligence in failing to meet the reasonable investi-
gation standard, §§ 9 and 18 do not. Section 9(e) holds liable only those persons who
"willfully" participate in the prohibited actions; section 18(a) allows a defense by any
person acting in good faith without knowledge of the falsity or misleading character of
a statement. For an early discussion of the standard of conduct required for liability
under § 18, see Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Documents Filed under
Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J. 456, 474-75 (1935). If the
phrase "fraudulent misrepresentation" in § 11(f) is interpreted to require scienter, mean-
ing something more than mere negligence, every person held liable under §§ 9 or 18
of the Exchange Act will be guilty of "fraudulent misrepresentation." Thus, including
such language in §§ 9(e) and 18(b) would make the contribution provisions meaning-
less; no one held liable under §§ 9 or 18 would be able to recover contribution.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 18, 21 (1934). This seems fairly clear from the contribution pro-
visions themselves, especially the Exchange Act provisions. In cases not involving con-
tribution under the express contribution provisions, however, third-party defendants con-
tinue to argue otherwise. They contend that, if not joined as defendants in the main
action, they cannot be held liable as joint tortfeasors and therefore are not liable for
contribution. See, e.g., Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D.
Iowa 1973) (rejecting such contention). This contention derives chiefly from the re-
quirement of some states that a plaintiff must obtain a joint judgment against joint tort-
feasors in order for one tortfeasor to enforce contribution against another. For an ex-
ample of a federal court using this state rule to defeat a contribution claim against third-
party defendants in a securities case, see State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see notes 177-83
infra and accompanying text.
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contribution cases decided under the Companies Act of 192928 and its
predecessors 29 are significantly more helpful, since section 11 was close-
ly modeled ° on the contribution provision contained in the English
act.31 The contribution provisions under the Securities Act, the Ex-
change Act, and the Companies Act of 1929 all contain the phrase
"may recover contribution as in cases of contract." Because the civil
liabilities provided in the securities acts are tort liabilities3 2 and because
at common law no right to contribution existed among tortfeasors, a3 the
inclusion of this phrase is important. The "obvious purpose was to
avoid the ordinary policy against contribution among joint tortfeasors
... To determine just how and when contribution may be ob-
tained under the federal securities law, construction of this phrase is
necessary, considering both the English decisions under the Companies
Act and the common law as it existed in 1933.15
28. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23.
29. See notes 54-71 infra and accompanying text.
30. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933). See 3 Loss 1683.
31. Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, pt. II, § 37(3):
Every person who. .. becomes liable to make any payment under this sec-
tion may recover contribution, as in cases of contract, from any other person
who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same payment,
unless the person who has become so liable was, and that other person was not,
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
This provision, however, applies only to directors and those who have authorized the
issue of the prospectus, while § 11(f) applies to a broader group of persons. See Bar-
nett, The Securities Act of 1933 and the British Companies Act, 13 Hwv. Bus. Rlv. 1,
11 (1934).
32. See 7 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Companies § 259 n.2 (4th ed. 1974). In
the Companies Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 47, § 65(4), the English repealed the
right to recover contribution under § 37(3) of the Companies Act of 1929 and substi-
tuted the right to contribution applicable in other tort actions. See Law Reform (Mar-
ried Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30, pt. II, § 6.
33. See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
34. 3 Loss 1737. In Gerson v. Simpson, [1903] 2 K.B. 197, 200, the Court of Ap-
peal stated:
[W]ith reference to this particular class of tort, and to this class of persons
...who have issued a prospectus as in the present case, the ordinary rule that
there shall be no contribution between tortfeasors shall not apply, but the
rights of the parties shall be treated as though it were a question of contract,
and not of tort.
The Court of Appeal was interpreting § 5 of the Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 53
& 54 Vict., c. 64, the predecessor of the contribution provision in the Companies Act of
1929.
35. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 178
(1933).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Contribution as It Existed in 1933
1. The Common Law
Contribution is an equitable doctrine based on the principle that a
person who discharges a liability that he shares with another should not
bear the sole burden of payment. 6 Thus, if A and B are both liable for
a $1000 debt that B pays, B should recover from A at least part of the
payment. This right arises not from any express or implied contract but
from the "relations of the parties as persons liable for the same debt."3
It is an inchoate right, ripening into a cause of action when one party
pays more than his share of a common burden.3
Courts have often confused contribution with indemnity. Indemnity
means a shifting of the entire loss to another who, for equitable reasons,
should pay alone. Contribution, however, means a sharing of the
loss." Ordinarily, the loss is shared equally among all solvent parties
subject to a common liability,40 although the parties can by contract
36. Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184, 1185 (Ch. 1787); see Jones
v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
37. Shepheard v. Bray, [1906] 2 Ch. 235, 253, rev'd and dismissed on motion of
parties, [1907] 2 Ch. 571; see Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184, 1185
(Ch. 1787); 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 345, at 763
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
38. See Prisbrey v. Noble, 505 F.2d 170, 176 (10th Cir. 1974); Albert v. Dietz, 283
F. Supp. 854, 857 (D. Hawaii 1968); 2 WILLISTON § 345, at 773-75; Gregory, Contribu-
tion Among Tortleasors: A Uniform Practice, 13 Wis. L. Rnv. 365, 380-83 (1938).
But cf. Kahn v. Urania Lumber Co., 103 So. 2d 476, 478-80 (La. Ct. App. 1958). The
statute of limitations for the contribution claim generally runs from the date of pay-
ment. See 18 AM. JuR. 2d Contribution § 93 (1965).
39. See George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 130, 146 (1932). Some authorities also distinguish between the concepts on
the basis that the indemnity right springs from an express or implied contract. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Malco Refineries, 214 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1954); 2 WILLSTON § 345,
at 767. See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 76, 81, 86, 89-102 and Com-
ments (1937). For an introduction to the concept of "partial indemnification," see Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
40. In equity one who paid the whole debt could normally recover a proportionate
share from each person who was (1) liable when the contribution relation arose, (2)
solvent when payment was made, and (3) present in the jurisdiction. At law the num-
ber of persons originally liable was the only consideration in determining the aliquot
shares; thus a person who paid the whole debt could not recover anything on a share
allocable to one who was insolvent. See 8 HALSBuRY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Contract
§ 403 (3d ed. 1954); PRossER § 50, at 310; Gregory, supra note 38, at 372. In England
the equity rule is now also applied at law. Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
1261
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vary the contribution share.4"
Equity courts developed the contribution doctrine for co-sureties, 42 but
both courts of equity and of law have applied the doctrine whenever one
party has discharged a common liability.43 Tort law has been an
exception. The English refused to permit contribution to an intentional
tortfeasor;44 American courts also denied contribution to negligent tort-
feasors. 45  The rationale for this exception was that courts should not
mediate disputes between wrongdoers.48 Moreover, the knowledge that
a tortfeasor cannot share his liability with others equally negligent might
deter misconduct. Commentators have consistently rejected these rea-
sons, especially when applied to negligent tortfeasors. 47 Some Ameri-
Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 44. In some United States jurisdictions the equity
rule is also applied at law. 2 WILLISTON § 345, at 778; see RESTATEMENT OF REsnTru-
flON § 85, comments e, h (1937). Contribution need not be apportioned equally, how-
ever, if the parties have differing interests, responsibilities, or faults. See text accompa-
nying notes 270, 297-313 infra. If the potential contributor was originally liable, he need
not be liable for the common debt at the time contribution is sought. Thus, contribution
can be obtained although the statute of limitations has run on the original claim in favor
of one defendant, but not another, or even if the original claim did not survive the tort-
feasor's death. RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTIoN § 81, comment g (1937); id. § 83; see
Shepheard v. Bray, [1906] 2 Ch. 235, rev'd and dismissed on motion of parties, [1907]
2 Ch. 571.
Contribution is sometimes said to be based on subrogation, the one who pays being
substituted as the obligee. The contribution claimant cannot be enforcing the obligee's
rights since the obligee has been fully satisfied; he may, however, be enforcing similar
rights. See 4 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 935, at 763 (1951) [hereinafter cited as CoR-
BIN]. Similarly, it is difficult to see how an obligor can be subrogated to a claim that
the obligee himself could no longer enforce even if unsatisfied, as in the statute of lim-
itations and nonsurvival cases above. Courts generally view the right to contribution
as an inchoate right based on discharge of a common liability, see note 38 supra and
accompanying text, but the courts' results are not always consistent with this theory, as
in cases of interspousal immunity and the effects of partial settlements. See generally
Turck, Contribution Between Tortfeasors in American and German Law-A Compara-
tive Study, 41 TuIL. L. REv. 1, 13-14, 17-23 (1966).
41. See Batard v. Hawes, 118 Eng. Rep. 775 (Q.B. 1853); 1 S. WmLISTON, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 345, at 666 (1st ed. 1920).
42. See 14 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Equity § 935 (3d ed. 1956); cf. 4 CoR-
BiN § 931, at 739.
43. See 14 HALSBURY, supra note 42 § 934; 2 WLLISTON § 345, at 762-65.
44. The leading case denying contribution among tortfeasors is Merryweather v.
Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Because that case involved intentional joint
tortfeasors, subsequent English courts felt free to permit contribution in favor of nonin-
tentional tortfeasors. See 37 HALsBuRY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Tort § 247, at 137 n.(z)
(3d ed. 1962); PROSSER § 50, at 305-06.
45. See PROSSER § 50, at 306; RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruToN.§ 102 (1937).
46. See Leflar, supra note 39, at 133-34.
47. See PRosSER § 50, at 307; Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-Washington University Open Scholarship
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can courts, reacting to the harsh, no-contribution-among-tortfeasors
rule, developed special indemnity rules to allow a "passive" tortfeasor to
recover indemnity from an "active" torfeasor.48 Although elusive and
difficult to apply,49 these rules reflected a general view of the inequity
that the strict rule permitted; a plaintiff's whim in choosing a defendant
could subject a relatively innocent tortfeasor to complete liability, while
immunizing the tortfeasor chiefly at fault.50
These stopgaps, however, could not deal with situations in which the
faults were approximately equal.5 ' To remedy the injustice of requiring
one to pay when in fairness others should also pay, a number of state
legislatures and courts modified the strict rule against contribution
among tortfeasors.52 But in 1933 when the Securities Act was adopted,
most states still permitted contribution among tortfeasors only after a
joint judgment, and plaintiff was not required to sue all those potentially
liable to him. Thus, the problem remained; either plaintiff's whim or
collusion with a potential defendant could preclude contribution.53
feasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 557-60 (1936); Leflar, supra note 39, at 133-34; Turck,
supra note 40, at 9-11; Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among
Tortfeasors, 25 Am. U.L. REv. 203, 211-16 (1975).
48. E.g., Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 197, 229 N.E.2d
769, 774 (1967); see Comment, supra note 47, at 209-11. Indemnity is traditionally
given when there is an express agreement or when the conduct of one person is imputed
to another (as under the doctrine of respondeat superior); the special indemnity rules
governing all other circumstances developed directly from the restrictions on the right
to contribution. id. at 211. Some courts have devised an active-passive negligence test,
which is a type of misfeasance-nonfeasance test. See, e.g., King v. Timber Structures,
Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 178, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1966). Others, using the same active-
passive terms, refer to a difference in the quality or character of the negligence or in
the degree of culpability. See, e.g., Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., supra at 197-
202, 229 N.E.2d at 774-76. Some courts prefer the phrase "primary versus secondary
negligence" to "active versus passive negligence." See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972). Still others
allow indemnity if the parties are not in pari delicto. See Leflar, supra note 39, at 156.
See generally Ruder 652-54.
49. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 147-48, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-
92, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386-87 (1972); Leflar, supra note 39, at 155-58; Ruder 643-54.
50. See Comment, supra note 47, at 215-16; cf. Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc.,
86 I11. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1967).
51. If the faults were equal, indemnity would not lie under any of the theories. See
note 48 supra.
52. By 1932, 12 state legislatures had modified the rule by statute; in three other
states the courts had modified the rule. Leflar, supra note 39, at 141, 144-45 n.66 (cit-
ing and discussing the statutes).
53. See id. at 144-45 n.66.
Vol. 1975:1153] 1263
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2. The English Development of Contribution in the Securities Area
When the English Parliament enacted the Directors' Liability Act of
1890,11 it avoided the vagaries of contribution rules by permitting
corporate directors held liable for false statements in a prospectus to
recover contribution "as in cases of contract."" Thus, a director held
liable for making or acquiescing in a false statement, even if guilty of
fraud, could recover contribution from those co-directors who would
also have been liable under the Act had they been sued.50 While the
legislative history of the Directors' Liability Act does not explain the
preference for contribution as in contract rather than as in tort, the
reasons can be surmised. The law was a response to Derry v. Peek, 7
which exposed the inability of the common law deceit action to impose
liability on directors for false or misleading prospectuses."s  Thus,
Parliament provided the investor with a new cause of action against the
directors and promoters of a company issuing a prospectus.59 The
investor needed merely to show that, relying on the prospectus, he had
purchased stock in the company and had sustained loss or damage
because the prospectus contained one or more false statements.60 Any
director or promoter who could not prove that he had reasonable
grounds for believing that each of the false statements was true was
liable to compensate the investor for his loss.61 The Act served a dual
54. 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64.
55. Id. § 5:
Every person who by reason of his being a director ... has become liable
to make any payment under the provisions of this Act, shall be entitled to re-
cover contribution, as in cases of contract, from any other person who, if sued
separately, would have been liable to make the same payment.
56. See Gerson v. Simpson, [1903] 2 K.B. 197, 199-200 (C.A.).
57. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
58. See H. CHERRiNGTON, THE INVESTOR AND TnE SECuRiTmS AcT 89 (1942); 1
Loss 6; 3 Loss 1432, 1683; 346 PARL. DEn., H.C. (3d ser.) 570-71 (1890).
59. See Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64, § 3.
60. Id. § 3(1).
61. See id. § 3(1) (a); H. CHEuRINoTON, supra note 58, at 89-90. The requirement
that defendant shoulder the burden of proving reasonable grounds for believing the
prospectus to be true engendered considerable debate in Parliament. See, e.g., 346 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 581-82, 597, 604 (1890); 347 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 1864-
68, 1871-79 (1890). The promoter or director had a lesser burden when the statements
were based on expert testimony or official reports; he had only to prove that the untrue
statement fairly represented the statement made by the expert or in the official report.
See Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64, § 3(1) (b)-(c). The investor
could still recover, however, if he could show that the promoter or director "had no rea-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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purpose. First, it subjected to liability those figurehead directors who
knew nothing of the corporation's business affairs, but whose names lent
prestige to the prospectus.62 Such liability would not only provide more
financially responsible defendants but also discourage these persons
from becoming directors, while assuring that those who did would
be diligent in ascertaining the truth of statements in the prospectus.
63
Second, the Act more fairly allocated the burden of protecting poten-
tial investors. Such protection was the primary goal of the Act;64
in fairness, a single director should not pay the entire judgment
because he was the sole director named as defendant or subjected
to judgment. By providing for contribution as in contract, Parliament
allowed a director, regardless of his own fault, 5 to recover contribution
from any other director who would have been liable to make the same
payment had he been sued separately. 66 In 1907, the contribution
sonable ground to believe that the person making the statement . . . was competent to
make it .. .." Id. § 3 (1) (b).
62. See, e.g., 346 PARr.. DEn., H.C. (3d ser.) 569-71, 581-83, 587, 591-94 (1890);
345 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 616, 1249-50 (1890). Such directors were called "guinea-
pig directors." See I Loss 19; 346 PARL. DEB., supra at 587.
63. See 346 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 591-93 (1890); 347 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d
wr.) 1874 (1890); cf. 346 PARL. DEB., supra at 583, 587. The directors did not, how-
ever, have an affirmative obligation to test each statement in the prospectus for accuracy.
See H. CHERRINGTON, supra note 58, at 90.
64. See 346 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 575-76 (1890); cf. 345 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(3d ser.) 1267 (1890).
65. It should be noted that in 1890, the situations in which a wrongdoer could other-
wise obtain contribution were rather unclear, especially when the torts were committed
in a corporate context. See T. COOLEY, THE ELE1ENTs OF TORTS 42-44 (1895); N.
LINDL Y, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING ITS APPLICATION TO
COMPANIES 771-74 (4th ed. 1881).
66. See Directors' Liability Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64 § 5, quoted in note
55 supra. The Directors' Liability Act imposed liability on directors and promoters only
for injuries caused to investors by untrue prospectus statements. When Parliament en-
acted the Companies Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, it prescribed elaborate content
requirements for prospectuses in § 10(1), but provided no express right of contribution
with respect to any liabilities that might be incurred for violation. See id. § 10. An
amendment that would have provided a contribution right was proposed by Sydney
Gedge in the House of Commons, but was defeated 97 to 42. 87 PAL... DEB., H.C. (4th
ser.) 89-92 (1900). Mr. Gedge found it inconsistent that a contribution right existed
under the Directors' Liability Act when "an untrue statement had been made and a great
wrong had resulted" but not under the Companies Act of 1900 "[w]hen a director con-
curred in omitting to comply with some of the intricate requirements . . . in regard to
the issue of the prospectus. ... ." Id. at 204. The Companies Act of 1900, however,
gave broad defenses to any liability incurred for violation of the Act's prospectus re-
quirements-the director needed only prove that he was unaware of the matter not dis-
closed or that the noncompliance was due to "an honest mistake of fact on his part."
Vol. 1975:1153] 1265
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provision was amended to preclude a director guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation from recovering contribution from a director who was
not.67  The amendment implicitly recognized, however, that a director
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation could obtain contribution from
those directors who were equally culpable.
By the time Congress passed the 1933 Securities Act, Parliament had
consolidated the various English Companies Acts into the Companies
Act of 1929.18 The 1929 Act incorporated essentially the same contri-
bution provision69 as the Directors' Liability Act of 1890,70 limited to
directors' liabilities for untrue statements in prospectuses.7' In contrast,
section 11 of the federal Securities Act included all persons signing the
registration statement, the directors of the issuer, the issuers, the experts
and the underwriters. 72  To distribute fairly the large risk among all
Companies Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 10(7). In addition, the Act contained
no express private damages section, only criminal penalties for anyone willfully making
a false statement in a report or document required by the Act. See id. § 28. Thus,
an investor could recover damages only by a common law action or, if the prospectus
contained a false statement, by suit under § 3 of the Directors' Liability Act of 1890.
Had the statute contained a specific liability-to-investors section, it seems likely that a
contribution provision would have been included.
In the Companies Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 50, Parliament further developed the dis-
closure policy of the Companies Act of 1900, and included numerous penalty clauses
for violations. Because of the harshness of some of the provisions and the fear that
severe punishment for negligence might drive away the "good men" and leave "directors
of an inferior class" in their place, see 171 PAnL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 172 (1907),
Parliament provided a relief clause in § 32 of the 1907 Act. This clause gave the courts
express power to grant partial or complete relief to directors liable "for negligence or
breach of trust" but who had "acted honestly and resonably, and ought fairly to be ex-
cused. . . ." Companies Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 50, § 32. The House of Commons
expressly rejected, however, a provision that would have extended a similar power to the
courts in cases of "honest oversight, inadvertence, or error of judgment," see 181 PAML.
DEn., H.C. (4th ser.) 892 (1907), finding that the first relief provision was sufficient
to "give all reasonable protection to the directors." Id. at 900. See generally id. at 892-
900. A provision similar to § 32 is now contained in the Companies Act of 1948, 11
& 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 448. See J. CHARLESwoRTH, COMPANY LAWv 195 (8th ed. 1965);
5 HALsBnuy, SrATuTEs OF ENGLAND 427, General Note (3d ed. 1968).
67. See Companies Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 50, § 33. Without such an addition,
it seems clear that the right to contribution would have been allowed without regard to
relative culpability. See Gerson v. Simpson, [1903] 2 K.B. 197, 199-200 (C.A.).
68. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23.
69. Id. pt. 11, § 37(3), quoted in note 31 supra.
70. 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64, § 5, quoted in note 55 supra. The 1929 Act provision
contained the 1907 amendments. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
71. See Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, pt. If, § 37.
72. Promoters were also liable for false prospectuses. See id.; 3 Loss 1722-23;
Barnett, supra note 31, at 11-15.Washington University Open Scholarship
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those potentially liable, a right of contribution was essential. Absent an
express provision, the strict American common law would probably
have denied contribution to negligent and intentional violators 73 of
section 11.74
C. Contribution Since 1933
Since 1933, a number of states have modified their contribution
rules;75 two uniform contribution acts have been recommended to the
states;7' and the English have granted tortfeasors a statutory contribu-
tion right based on equity and responsibility for injury.77  The 1939
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act permits contribution
among jointly or severally liable tortfeasors, 78 including an optional
provision permitting allocation of damages according to fault.7" The
1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act rejects the optional
provision and expressly restricts the contribution right to nonintentional
tortfeasors.80 Neither Uniform Act has in fact created much uniformi-
73. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Ruder 649. Section 11 provides all those potentially liable for misstate-
ments, except the issuer, with certain defenses termed "due diligence defenses." Al-
though a negligence standard and a "due diligence defense" standard do not necessarily
coincide, a person who cannot establish due diligence with regard to an untrue statement
will normally be negligent in his "duty" to uncover false statements or in his common
law duty of care. For a thorough discussion of the standards of diligence and care re-
quired by § 11, see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The Bar-
Chris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1 (1969).
75. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886A, comment a at 199 & Ex-
planatory Note, comment a at 204-05 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970) and Comment, Contri-
bution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEx. L. Rnv. 326 & nn.4, 5 (1965) with note 52
supra.
76. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recom-
mended the first Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1939. Because the
Commissioners found that this proposed Act had not created uniformity, they withdrew
the Act in 1955, substituting a substantially revised version, the 1955 Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act. See UNIFORM CONTSrUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs AcT,
Prefatory Note (1955). The uniform acts with their notes and official comments are
reprinted in 12 U.L.A. 57-107 (master ed. 1975).
77. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5,
c. 30, § 6. See generally 37 HAI.SRURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Tort §§ 247-49 (3d ed. 1962,
Supp. 1975). This provision applies to tortfeasors in general. In 1947, Parliament sub-
stituted this general contribution right for that contained in the Companies Act of 1929.
See note 32 supra; notes 320-22 infra and accompanying text.
78. UNIFORM CoNTREBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1, 2(1) (1939 version).
79. Id. § 2(4). See Gregory, supra note 38, at 374-75.
80. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASoRS ACT §§ 1(c), 2 (1955 version);
see Turck, supra note 40, at 20 & n.121. Note that § 1(c) contains an optional phrase
that would expressly preclude contribution among reckless tortfeasors as well.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/4
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ty; heterogeneity remains the rule.81
Despite, or perhaps because of, the enduring common law rule, the
drafters of the Uniform Securities Act8 2 included the express provision:
"There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons
so liable."8 3 The dispositive factor for contribution is not the degree of
fault or identification as defendant, but initial liability under the Act.
Once this is determined, the person must look to state law to determine
when contribution is permitted in contracts cases and the exact nature of
the action. Of the 34 jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform
Securities Act in whole or in major part, 4 26 included the contribution
provision as it appeared in the Act,8 and five included other contribu-
81. Uniform Laws Annotated lists only ten states that have adopted in substance
and retained the 1939 version and six states that have adopted in substance the 1955
version. 12 U.L.A. 62, 66-67 (master ed. 1975).
82. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
the Uniform Securities Act on Aug. 25, 1956. UNIFoRM SEcu rns AcT, Comment to
Title. The Uniform Securities Act is reprinted with the official comments in L. Loss
& E. Cow='r, BLUE SKY Lw (1958); 7 U.L.A. 691-795 (master ed. 1970); 1 BLUB
SKY L. REP. 4901-53 (1971).
83. UNnFonim SEcuRrrins AcT § 410(b). The Official Comment contains only a
one-sentence explanation of why this provision was included: "The last sentence, with
reference to contribution, is a safeguard to avoid the common law rule which prohibits
contribution among joint tortfeasors." UNFoRM SEcumaRiEs AcT § 410(b), Comment.
The provision was modeled after the federal contribution provisions. See text accom-
panying note 34 supra. The uniform provision differs, however, in that it is located in
a single section with all the civil liability provisions. Since no implied causes of action
can be created by the Act, there will be no occasion to imply a contribution right under
another provision of the Act. See UNIFORM SEcuRmTEs AcT § 410(h). This is hardly
the case under the federal securities laws. See generally notes 134-61 infra and accom-
panying text.
84. The 34 jurisdictions include 32 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4901 (Dec. 1975).
85. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220(c) (1962); ARK. SrAT. ANN. § 67-1256(b) (1966);
CoLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-125(2) (1973); DnL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7323(b)
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2413(b) (1973); IND. CODE § 23-2-1-19(b) (Bums Supp.
1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268(b) (1974); Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 292.480(2)
(1971); MD. CORP. & Assoc. CODE ANN. § 11-703(c)(2) (1975); MASS. ANN. LA-vs
ch. 110A, § 410(b) (1975); McH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(410)(b) (1975); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80A.23 Subd. 3 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.411(b) (1969); NED. Rav.
STAT. § 8-1118(2) (1974); NEV. Rxv. STAT. § 90.200(2) (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:3-71(b) (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A.56(c) (1975); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 408(b) (Supp. 1975); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, § 890(b) (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-310 (1962); UTAH CODE ANqN. § 61-1-22(2) (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
539(b) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CoDa ANN.
§ 32-4-410(b) (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59(4) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-117.22(b) (1965).Washington University Open Scholarship
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tion provisions.86 Five of the 18 states that have not yet adopted the
Uniform Securities Act permit contribution in their securities laws.87
86. Two states used the Uniform Act language, but omitted the phrase "as in cases
of contract" from their contribution provisions. ID AO CODE § 30-1446(2) (1967);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2022(2) (1967). Oregon's provision is 'Vorded differ-
ently, but to similar effect. ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (1973) ("Any person held
liable under this section shall be entitled to contribution from those jointly and severally
liable with him"). The Iowa statute restricts the right of contribution by providing that
a "person whose willful violation. . . has given rise to any civil liability" may not re-
cover contribution from any "person guilty merely of a negligent violation." Iowa Uni-
form Securities Act, House File 825, § 503.2 (July 18, 1975) (1975 IowA LEGIS. SERV.
519). The statute also provides a right of indemnification against certain willful vio-
lators. id. Pennsylvania's provision is similar except that the right of contribution is
expressly "based upon each person's proportionate share of the total liability" and the
right of indemnification is limited to corporations. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-503(b)
(Supp. 1975). Three states included no contribution provision in statutes modeled on
the Uniform Securities Act: ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (subsection
(b) is exactly like Uniform Securities Act § 410(b) except that the contribution sen-
tence is omitted); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 485-20 (1968) (civil remedies section is substan-
tially different from Uniform Securities Act § 410); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-31
(1966) (same).
87. Of the five states, three have liability sections based on the Uniform Securities
Act § 410(b) and include a similar contribution provision. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
I 36-346(b) (1975); GA. CODE ANr. § 97-114(b) (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
I 51:715B (Supp. 1976). California's provision is similar to Pennsylvania's, discussed in
note 86, in that it provides a right "based upon each person's proportionate share of the
total liability," prevents willful violators from recovering contribution from negligent vio-
lators, and allows corporations a right of indemnification against certain willful vio-
lators. CAL. CORP. CoDn § 25505 (Deering Supp. 1975). California is the only state,
however, to include in its securities act a statute of limitations designed expressly for con-
tribution actions: "one year after final judgment based upon the liability for which the
right of . . . contribution exists." Id. § 25508 (also applicable to right of indemnifica-
tion). The Ohio contribution provision is unique in providing that a director who pays
a judgment based on liability for a false prospectus statement is subrogated to the plain-
tiffs rights; he can then recover contribution against fellow directors who would also
be individually liable under the same liability section. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.41
(1964); cf. note 40 supra (subrogation theory).
Of the 13 states that have adopted neither the Uniform Securities Act nor express con-
tribution provisions in their securities acts, seven specify persons who are jointly and
severally liable to the purchaser, thus permitting easy application of an implied contri-
bution right or a statutory provision for contribution among tortfeasors. ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1967) (also provides for liability to a seller); FLA. STAT. ANN.
* 517.21(1) (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1212, § 137.13 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1960); S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-31-133
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1645 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4225 (1971).
Two states impose liability in certain circumstances, without reference to whether it is
joint or several. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 881 (Supp. Pamphlet 1973); TEx. REV.
Crv. STAT. AN.s. art. 581-33 (1964). Mississippi's sole civil liability provision is recov-
ery on the bond required of investment companies for the sale of securities. Miss. CODE
1269
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/4
1270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:1153
Virtually no court has found occasion to interpret any of the contribu-
tion provisions.
Ill. INDEMNIFICATION TO SHIFT SECURITIES
LAW LIABILITIES
A. Indemnity Agreements
'Until recently, the interest in contribution was minimal since persons
subject to civil liability under the securities laws could completely shift
such liabilities through indemnity agreements.8 8 Unless contrary to
public policy, such agreeements are generally enforceable despite the
culpability of the indemnitee5 9 Indemnification agreements thus com-
monly accompanied the registration requirements of the Securities
Act. ° Typically, the underwriter and the issuer each agreed to indem-
nify the other for liabilities arising from its own acts or omissions."1 In
the 1940's, when many states began to permit corporations to indemnify
ANN. § 75-71-25 (1972). Three states do not expressly authorize private damage suits
in their securities acts, prescribing only criminal penalties and fines. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421:40 (Supp. 1975) (criminal penalty section); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 339-a
(McKinney 1968) (making false statements with intent to deceive is a misdemeanor);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-11-24 (Supp. 1974) (criminal penalty section). New York
courts have implied a private right of action under the New York section. See Barnes
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 69 Misc. 2d 1068, 332 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1972),
modified on other grounds, 42 App. Div. 2d 15, 344 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1973).
88. Indemnity agreements generally provide that the indemnitor is liable to reim-
burse the indemnitee for all expenses incurred with respect to specified claims and liabil-
ities asserted against the indemnitee. Many agreements limit this right according to the
indemnitee's culpability. Thus, for example, a clause may preclude indemnification
when the liability arises from willful misfeasance or, occasionally, from negligent con-
duct.
89. See 37 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND Tort § 250 (3d ed. 1962); cf. RESTATE-
MENT OF REsr=oN § 88, Comment c (1937).
90. See Barnett, supra note 31, at 15. Copies of all material contracts must be filed
with the registration statement. Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970); Schedule
A(24), (28), (30), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(24), (28), (30) (1970). The registration forms
under the Securities Act also provide that the registrant must state the effect of any pro-
vision under which a director or officer is to be indemnified for any liability incurred
in his official capacity. E.g., Securities Act Form S-1, Item 29, reprinted in 2 CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 8260 (1970).
91. Under the standard underwriter-issuer agreement, the underwriter is responsible
only for the information it furnishes, and the issuer is responsible for all other informa-
tion. See 3 Loss 1834-35; Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 72 YALE L.J. 406 (1962). For an example of a clause in which
the issuer agrees to indemnify the underwriter, see Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
418 F.2d 1276, 1287 n.14 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).Washington University Open Scholarship
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officers and directors, indemnification of corporate officials against
securities liability became widespread.9 2 The Securities and Exchange
Commission took the position that indemnification of corporate officers
was contrary to public policy,9 3 but did not object on public policy
92. See 3 Loss 1829-30. For discussion of the state statutes, see Bishop, Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors
and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1078-85 (1968); Brook, Directors' Indemnification and
Liability Insurance, 21 N.Y.L.F. 1, 2-22 (1975); Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, Liabili-
ties Which Can Be Covered Under State Statutes and Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAW.
109, 110-28 (Special Issue 1972) (separate addresses at the ABA National Institute on
"Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities," Oct. 22, 1971); Sebring, Recent
Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others,
23 Bus. LAw. 95, 95-110 (1967).
93. In a 1957 note to rule 460, the Commission formally enunciated its opposition
to registrant's indemnifying their directors, officers, and controlling persons against Se-
curities Act liabilities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 n.(a), (b) (1975); see 1 Loss 280. The
Commission indicated it would refuse to accelerate the registration statement unless (1)
the registrant obtained a waiver of those indemnification benefits from its directors, offi-
cers, and controlling persons, or (2) it included in its registration statement a disclosure
that such indemnification might be unenforceable on public policy grounds and that it
would submit the question to a court if a director, officer, or controlling person asserted
a claim for indemnification against liabilities arising under the Securities Act (except
with respect to expenses incurred for a successful defense). These waivers or undertak-
ings must be filed with the registration statement, but need not appear in the prospectus.
For answers to Form S-I, Item 29, supra note 90, that the Commission has accepted,
see 2 CCH F.. SEc. L. REP. If 8260 (1970). For those registrants that do not re-
quest acceleration, a statement disclosing the possible invalidity of indemnification provi-
sions must be included in the prospectus. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936(46)
(Dec. 9, 1968). See Minerals Consol., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 470, 475 (1959) (finding regis-
tration statement deficient for failure to make such disclosure).
Still unclear are the legal consequences of such an undertaking to submit indemnifica-
tion questions to a court. For example, the court in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), held Leasco and three of its directors
jointly and severally liable for violations of § 11. After the judgment and pursuant to
its undertaking, Leasco asked the court whether it could pay the full amount of the judg-
ment itself and not seek contribution from the directors held liable. The SEC, invited
to submit a memorandum, objected that the failure to seek contribution was indirectly
the same as paying indemnity and "to allow directors to avoid the consequences of their
lack of diligence by indemnification from the issuer . . . would frustrate the Congres-
sional purpose." BNA Snc. Rao. & L. REP. No. 135, at A-6 (Jan. 19, 1972) (summary
of SEC memorandum and arguments).
The Leasco directors "ultimately contributed relatively small amounts." Freund &
Hacker, supra note 5, at 472 n.67. The undertaking clause was also directly involved
in Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The settle-
ment specifically provided that the individual defendants waived any rights of indemnifi-
cation from Texas Gulf for amounts paid in settlement and for expenses. Id. at 314-
15. See also Comment, Indemnification of Directors for Section 11 Liability, 48 TEX.
L. REv. 661, 669 n.47, 670 (1970) (insignificant coercive effect of rule 460).
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grounds to other agreements, such as the standard underwriter-issuer
agreement."4
B. Reaction of the Courts
1. Globus I and its Progeny
Until 1968, courts looked to the relevant state corporate or common
law to determine indemnity rights, ignoring the implications of federal
securities law.9 5 The decision in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.
(Globus 1)96 severely jolted the complacency with which underwriters,
accountants, directors, and officers had viewed indemnity agreements.
Globus I refused on grounds of federal public policy to enforce an in-
demnity agreement between an issuer and underwriter. A jury found
that the underwriter, the issuer, and the issuer's president had violated
94. See 3 Loss 1834-35. Although the Commission has never objected to these
agreements, courts have recently held such agreements unenforceable by underwriters,
analogizing the underwriters to the controlling persons whose indemnification by the
corporations is against public policy. E.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.460
n.(a), (b) (1975); 3 H. BLOOMENTAL, SEcurrxs AND FEDERAL CoRpoRATE LAw § 8.29
[2], at 8-86 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL]; Note, supra note 91, at 407,
411. The Commission similarly has not objected to the indemnity agreements made
with underwriters by selling shareholders. See 3 Loss 1834; cf. Lyons v. Marrud, Inc.,
46 F.R.D. 451, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Because underwriter indemnity agreements made
by a controlling shareholder in a secondary distribution are similar to those made by
the corporation, it seems likely that courts will also hold these agreements unenforce-
able on public policy grounds.
Since 1928, the English have prohibited indemnity agreements by companies in favor
of directors or auditors when the directors or auditors are guilty of negligence or breach
of trust with respect to the company. For discussion of the relevant English history,
see 3 Loss 1831 n.490; Note, supra note 91, at 411 n.38 (1962). See also J. CHARLES-
WORTH, supra note 66, at 194-95.
95. See, e.g., Handel-Maatschappij H. Albert De Bary & Co., N.V. v. Faradyne
Electronics Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (issuer seeking indemnity from its
underwriter); Behar v. Savard, 21 F.R.D. 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (partners in a brok-
erage partnership seeking indemnity from a salesman employee). In both cases, the
courts refused to dismiss third-party indemnity claims because, under New York law, a
principal held liable for the conduct of his agent could recover indemnity from the agent.
Neither case involved an indemnity agreement.
96. 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd in part and rev'd in part, 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The term "Globus 1" will refer
to this set of proceedings. The term "Globus I" will refer to the subsequent proceedings
in which the defendant underwriter sought contribution from the other defendants.
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
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the federal securities law by circulating a misleading advertisement of a
stock sale.9 7 The district court then voided the indemnity agreement on
which the underwriter sought to escape liability. The Second Circuit,
affirming that ruling,9" restricted its holding to persons who "committed
a sin graver than ordinary negligence;" 9 but the rationale extended much
further.100 Civil liabilities were "designed not so much to compensate
the defrauded purchaser as" 101 to encourage diligent investigation and
compliance with the Securities Act. Therefore, reasoned the court, to
allow an underwriter with actual knowledge of misstatements to recover
indemnity from a slightly "more liable" issuer would substantially
impede the federal objective of full disclosure; the underwriter would
lack financial incentive for a diligent independent investigation. 10 2
Courts thereafter examined indemnification in light of federal policy
and regularly denied indemnity claims. Of the reported securities cases
that considered the indemnity issue in preliminary proceedings, only
one court held that an indemnification agreement was properly assert-
ed. 0 s Other courts either denied leave to file such a claim,10 4 denied
97. The jury found that all three parties had violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970), and that the underwriter had also violated § 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 771(s) (1970), and § 15(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970).
98. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970) (affirming district court in all respects except punitive damage
award).
99. 418 F.2d at 1288.
100. See Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
3A BLOOMENTHAL § 8.27[2], at 8-87.
101. 418 F.2d at 1288. Although the suit was not brought under § 11 of the Securi-
ties Act because the offering was made pursuant to Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-
.262 (1975), the court nevertheless analogized to the policies behind § 11. See 418 F.2d
at 1279, 1288.
102. 418 F.2d at 1288-89; see 3 Loss 1831; Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability
on Investment Banking and the New Issues Markets, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 809 (1972);
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
29, 35 (1959); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Se-
curities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1403, 1418-21 (1963); Note, supra
note 91, at 409-11. For an economic social-cost analysis of the balancing of liability
risks against the costs of verifying information for securities offerings, see Dooley, supra
at 835-36.
103. Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970). But cf. Katz v. Realty
Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975) (in consolidating 17 private securities
cases for pretrial purposes, court stated that all defendants would be deemed to have as-
serted cross-claims for indemnification and contribution against all other defendants).
In Carpenter, the reorganization trustee brought action on behalf of Westec Corp. to
obtain restitution of the amounts he paid in compromising the securities claims asserted
1273
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indemnity based solely on the pleadings,' °5 or deferred the decision
against Westec because of the wrongful conduct of Westec's agents and employees. The
trustee contended that although Westec was liable for the wrong, Wester could neverthe-
less seek indemnity under Texas law from other defendants who had aided and exploited
the wrongful conduct of Westec's agents and employees because those defendants were
more culpable than Westec. 311 F. Supp. at 1105-06, 1113. Accepting this argument
and finding that under Texas indemnity principles the trustee stepped into the "shoes
of the defrauded" investors, the court dismissed all arguments that such indemnity was
against public policy and permitted the trustee to assert the investors' claims under
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), to the extent of the amounts
paid in compromise. See 311 F. Supp. at 1105, 1113. By virtue of these subrogated
or assigned claims, the trustee was permitted to act as representative of a class of injured
investors. In addition, the trustee asserted damage claims for direct injuries to the cor-
poration.
The Carpenter court upheld an indemnity agreement because the corporation, being
"less responsible," id. at 1106, was not in pad delicto with the defendants. For discus-
sion of use of the in par! delicto defense in securities cases, see James v. DuBreuil, 500
F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Ruder 659-65. The Carpenter court's reasoning is unpersua-
sive. As a controlling person under § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970), the
corporation is equally liable with its agents for the latter's fraudulent activities, a result
no different than the common law of respondeat superior. The corporation can surely
recover indemnity from its agents for damages paid by the corporation but occasioned
by the agent's misdeeds. See Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974);
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 816 (D. Colo. 1968); Note, Corpo-
rate Indemnification for 10b-5 Violations, 70 COLum. L. REv. 504 (1970); cf., e.g., CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25505 (Deering Supp. 1975). When the corporation seeks indemnity
from persons whose actions are not imputed to the corporation, however, it should suc-
ceed only if there is a substantial difference in degree of fault between the indemnitor
and the corporate agents. If the corporate agents are themselves liable under § 10(b),
that difference should not be great. Cf. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 136-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (when corporate underwriter and
accounting firm were equally culpable, underwriter could not assert § 10(b) claim as
assignee of purchasers against accountants). At any rate, the court should have specif-
ically addressed the federal securities policies affected by the indemnity claim. What-
ever the status of that claim under state law, the federal policies remain the same. The
trustee also asserted a claim for contribution which the court ignored beyond noting that
it was barred. Id. at 1106.
104. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49
F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (third-party complaint for indemnity and contribution
struck on the basis of New York law).
105. Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1974) (group could
not seek indemnity on theory inconsistent with theory on which the group itself was al-
leged to be liable); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 955-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (if broker-dealer is found liable under any of the securities fraud sec-
tions of § 12(2) of the Securities Act, the level of guilt would be too great to recover
indemnity for such liabilities); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 385 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (accountant could not recover indemnity from
issuer for § 10(b) liability); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,544 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (when alleged that defend-
ant accountant had actual knowledge of falsity of statements it certified, accountantWashington University Open Scholarship
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while noting that such relief was unlikely. 0 6
The results after trial depended on the liability of the indemnitee and,
if liable, on the culpability of the indemnifier. Thus, one court permit-
ted a corporation to recover from officers motivated by private gain
whose fraudulent conduct had been imputed to the corporation. 07
Another court required an unsuccessful corporate plaintiff to indemnify
a defendant accountant exonerated at trial and, as a faithful corporate
servant, entitled to indemnification under the corporate charter. But
the corporation's president, also exonerated, was not entitled to indemni-
ty, since the action from which the lawsuit arose had been taken for his
private benefit.'08 Three other courts emphatically denied indemnifica-
could not seek full indemnity from others who allegedly failed to disclose true facts to
accountant); State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (companion
case to Tucker). But cf. State Mut. Life Assur. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
65 F.R.D. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (subsequent pretrial proceedings in State Mutual case
in which third-party complaint asking for contribution or indemnity was filed without
discussion of propriety of indemnity).
106. Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (lawyers
and accountants seeking indemnity from a number of individuals and corporation); B
& B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (accountant and
issuer seeking indemnity from selling shareholder); State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Amer-
ica v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D. 389, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (counterclaim to
accountant's third-party claim) (opinion sets forth the procedural maze of cross-claims,
counterclaims, and third-party claims for indemnification or contribution filed up to that
point in State Mutual action); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569
(S.D. Iowa 1973) (broker-dealer seeking indemnity from issuer, issuer's directors, and
accounting firm); Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,749, at 93,274 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (accountant
seeking indemnity from issuer and issuer's directors).
107. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974). Because the officers
committed the unauthorized acts constituting the § 10(b) violation in order to benefit
themselves, there was a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation. See also deHaas
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 816 (D. Colo. 1968); Note, supra note 103.
108. Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974). Vosko, the presi-
dent of Atlas Petroleum, sold that corporation to Koch. Koch unsuccessfully sued both
Vosko and an accounting firm for fraud and Securities Act violations in the sale. Be-
cause Vosko was not acting in his official capacity when he sold Atlas, that corporation's
charter did not grant him indemnification. The accountant, however, had made a report
at the request of Atlas, and there was no finding that the report was negligently pre-
pared. Atlas' charter did allow the accountant to recover indemnity; the indemnitor
would have to be Koch which had taken over the liabilities of Atlas. The state law
governing each corporation permitted such an award; federal policy had no objection to
the award of legal fees for a successful defense. Consequently, Koch was required to
indemnify the accountant.
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tion.109 In each, the indemnity claimants' liability for securities viola-
tions depended on either their own tortious conduct or conduct imputed
to them from sources other than the indemnifiers.
2. Consideration of Federal Policy Interests
In all but two"10 of the cases decided after Globus 1, the courts
carefully considered federal securities policy in determining the proprie-
ty of indemnification relief. State law was relevant in determining
individual right to indemnity,"' and corporate power to indemnify,"12
but both were subject to the overriding demands of federal securities
law. In short, the enforceability of an indemnity claim became a matter
primarily of federal rather than state law." 3
Courts usually engaged in a limited fault analysis. Thus, in cases of
imputed liability, as in the principal-agent relation, courts permitted
recovery from the one whose conduct was imputed, at least if the agent
was acting to benefit himself."x4 When both parties to an indemnity
109. Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1366 (D. Md. 1975) (neither corporate
transfer agent nor corporate counsel were "significantly more responsible" for plaintiff's
injuries than were defendants who sold stock to plaintiff); Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D. Del. 1974) (in addition to corporation's liability
for proxy violations as a principal responsible for actions of its agents, corporation also
liable on its own account and therefore neither agent nor corporation could recover in-
demnity from the other); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378
F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (accountant could not recover indemnity from un-
derwriter when both chargeable with knowing participation in the fraudulent miscon-
duct).
110. Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970), discussed in note 103
supra; State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49
F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (striking indemnity claim under New York law).
111. See State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
49 F.R.D. 202, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,543, at 95,867 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp.
946, 954 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400,
403-05 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (contribution and indemnity
with respect to mid-air plane collisions should be determined under federal common law).
112. See Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 725 (10th Cir. 1974); text ac-
companying note 92 supra.
113. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559,
569 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
114. See note 107 supra; cf. Handel-Maatschappij H. Albert De Bary & Co., N.y.
v. Faradyne Electronics Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Because a corporation
"can be liable for fraud only through the conduct of its agents," Thomas v. Duralite
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claim were equally culpable, courts uniformly denied indemnity. 115
Should the degree of fault diverge significantly, however, the courts
would face more difficult problems. For example, should a negligent
indemnity claimant recover from a person guilty of intentional
fraud? 116 The relevant purposes of the securities laws must provide
the yardstick; but since the various liability sections have differing
purposes, each section requires a separate determination. 11"
Thus, the court in Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,"18
relying on the regulatory purposes of section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act,11 denied indemnity to any person violating the section. The court
refused to consider relative culpabilities, emphasizing that section 14(a)
is designed to protect "the interest of informed corporate suffrage" and
"only a realistic possibility of liability for damages will encourage due
diligence by those who solicit proxies."'120 The section penalizes negli-
Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 728 (D.N.J. 1974), this indemnity situation will frequently arise
when a corporation is held liable under § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(a) (1970), or § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). A corpora-
tion, however, could be directly liable under § 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1 (1970), and § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
These direct liabilities would not present the same possibilities for indemnity as the vi-
carious liabilities. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D.
Del. 1974) (§ 14(a) liability).
115. See, e.g., Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1366 (D. Md. 1975).
116. A number of courts have adverted to this problem. See, e.g., Odette v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Getter v. R.G. Dickin-
son & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973). See generally Ruder, supra note
2, at 651-59. Courts may have a tendency to find the parties equally culpable, espe-
cially when both parties know of the misstatement or misconduct. For example, in
Globus 1, the jury awarded the underwriter an indemnity against the other defendants
and assessed a smaller amount of punitive damages against the underwriter than against
the issuer's president. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1279 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Thus, the jury apparently found the un-
derwriter less culpable than the other defendants. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Both the district court, see id. at 198-99, and
the court of appeals, see 418 F.2d at 1289, were unimpressed with the argument that
the issuer's agents were "active" wrongdoers while the underwriter was only a "passive"
tortfeasor. When presented with a claim for contribution, the district court found the
parties equally culpable. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955,
957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a! 'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
941 (1971).
117. Cf. ALl FED. Sac. CoDE § 1418(e) (3), (4), Comments 2, 3 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1973).
118. 387F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
120. 387 F. Supp. at 168.
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gent conduct, a congressional objective that would be thwarted if negli-
gent persons could recover from those more culpable.' 2 1
Sections 1 1 and 12(2) of the Securities Act 2 2 also encourage diligent
investigation by punishing negligent conduct. One court has already
held that "[i]ndemnification must . . . be denied to encourage the
reasonable care required by" section 12(2);123 a similar analysis would
deny indemnity for section 11 liabilities.' 24  The antifraud sections of
the securities acts 25 present different questions. To maximize deter-
rence of deliberate deception, some courts have assumed that persons
guilty of such deception should indemnify others substantially less culp-
able.126  Other courts have reasoned that the level of culpability neces-
sary to attach liability under the antifraud sections is so great that
indemnity is never proper.12 7
Regardless of the outcome in a particular case, however, it is clear
that an indemnity agreement provides no effective protection for defend-
ants held liable for damages under the securities acts. Insurance is a
partial answer, though often difficult and expensive to obtain.12 8 More-
121. Id. at 167-68; see Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858-
65 (D. Del. 1972) (extensive discussion of negligence standard for § 14(a) private
damages liability).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1(2) (1970).
123. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(defendant not allowed to pursue claim for indemnification against potential § 12(2)
liability).
124. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); 3 Loss 1831; Note, supra note 91.
125. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); Exchange Act § 10(b),
15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c) (1970).
126. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Del.
1974).
127. See Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 955-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
128. Kroll, supra note 2, at 685. Two basic types of insurance are available: the
blanket policy, which covers all liabilities asserted against the insured except those spe-
cifically excluded, and the specific-issue policy, which covers securities liabilities arising
from a specific registration statement. Corporations, when permitted by state law, usu-
ally purchase blanket policies that protect the corporation and its officers and directors
from liability when acting in their official capacity. See BLOOMENTHAL § 8.27[31, at
8-87. See generally Bishop, supra note 92, at 1086-90 (with respect to Delaware law);
Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 92, at 114-15, 121-30. Underwriters also pur-
chase this type of policy, but it is "almost impossible" for them to obtain new ones.
Applebaum & McDowell, supra note 6, at 137. For a description of a typical blanket
policy, see Kroll, supra note 2. See also Brook, supra note 92, at 33-39. For a descrip-
tion of the typical specific-issue liability policy, see BLOOMErHAL § 8.27[3], at 8-88
to 8-90.Washington University Open Scholarship
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over, insurance may not cover liabilities under all the securities sections;
the policy may have a large deductible and insufficient limits; or the
insured's adjudged culpability may be too great to qualify for bene-
fits. 1 29 Finally, insurance policies, like indemnity agreements, may
ultimately be declared void as against the public policy of securities
laws.180
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLIED FEDERAL RIGHTS OF
CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAws
Prior indemnity agreements and liability insurance are thus increas-
ingly inadequate means of protecting the typical defendant in a securi-
ties suit. While an indemnification claim may commonly be filed, 3'
the hope that the court will shift the entire liability to another is often
unrealistic. A defendant who deliberately deceives a stock purchaser
cannot expect to recover indemnity. A court may, however, allow a
partial sharing of the judgment with another person guilty of fraudulent
misconduct. A party "too culpable to be entitled to indemnification
. . .may nevertheless be entitled to contribution."' 32  Under some
129. See generally BLOOMENTHAY § 8.27[3]; Hinsey, Delancey, Stahl & Kramer,
What Existing D & 0 Policies Cover, 27 Bus. LAw. 147 (Special Issue 1972) (separate
addresses at the ABA National Institute on "Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and
Liabilities," Oct. 22, 1971); Kroll, supra note 2, at 685-88.
130. The SEC has not yet asserted this argument, distinguishing insurance from in-
demnification on the basis of the source of payment and the possibility that the insurer
will deny liability. See BNA SEc. REr. & L. REP. No. 135, at A-7 (Jan. 19, 1972).
Commentators are generally apprehensive about insurance because it thwarts the federal
policy of encouraging diligent investigations, but have difficulty in rejecting it com-
pletely. They suggest that insurance policies as written possess some deterrent value or
could be rewritten to provide more. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 1090-1103 (would
allow insurance only against ordinary negligence of directors and officers in general cor-
porate policy); Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 92, at 122-30 (addresses by
Prof. Bishop and Mr. Arsht); Kroll, supra note 2, at 687-92, 714; Note, Indemnification
of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, supra
note 102, at 1427-30; Note, supra note 91, at 412. In defense of the propriety of cor-
porations purchasing insurance coverage for themselves and their directors, see Brook,
supra note 92, at 22-29.
131. Even if defendant is insured, he may file an indemnity claim to recover his de-
ductible or, at the request of the insurance carrier, to recover the latter's loss. Because
the carrier is usually subrogated to the rights of the insured, the insurer could also bring
a claim after the insured is adjudged liable to the plaintiff and damages have been paid
to discharge the liability. See generally BLOOMIENTHAL § 8.27[3], at 8-89; Applebaum &
McDowell, supra note 6, at 137-38.
132. Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974). For example,
§ 9(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970), subjects to civil liability only
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sections, such as section 11 of the Securities Act, a defendant guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation may not recover contribution from a per-
son not guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation; 8 but the average de-
fendant has a good chance of obtaining contribution from someone.
Ten years ago the likelihood would have been remote. Only section
11 of the Securities Act and sections 9 and 18 of the Exchange Act'18 4
expressly permit contribution, and defendants were seldom held liable
under these sections.' 35  Thus, if state law denied contribution to a
tortfeasor, a defendant could recover contribution only if a federal right
were implied. The basis for such an implication was the contribution
clause in those sections under which Congress expected multiple defend-
ants to be held liable; if other sections also generated multiple liability,
courts could reasonably imply a right to contribution in those sections
also.13 6 The first federal court to rule on this theory, in 1965, rejected
the implied federal right to contribution.187  Three years later, the court
in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.'8 8 reached the opposite conclusion,
implying a federal right to contribution under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act 39 on the basis of the multiple liability theory. 40 In
those persons who willfully participate in certain prohibited manipulative acts; yet, the
section expressly provides for contribution.
133. See Securities Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970), quoted il text accom-
panying note 21 supra.
134. See-notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
135. See 3 Loss 1721, 1748, 1753 & n.228 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
136. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
137. Shea v. Ungar, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,558
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Plaintiff's suit was based on § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1970), and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The
defendant attempted to implead others who were allegedly jointly and severally liable
with him to plaintiff under the controlling persons liability section. Securities Act
§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). The
court found that § 17(a) and § 10(b) created no contribution rights and that the con-
trolling persons sections did not permit contribution between controlling persons.
Therefore, the third-party defendants were not liable to the defendant for any part of
plaintiff's claim and could not be impleaded. The court also found that New York law
did not allow contribution.
In 1966 the court in Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 91,810, at 95,761, (D. Md. 1966), avoided ruling on the im-
plied contribution question by denying, on other grounds, leave to file the third-party
complaint.
138. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The defendants had inpleaded a third party asking
for indemnity and the third-party defendant had moved for dismissal of the third-party
complaint. Although the court determined that the defendant would not be entitled toWashington University Open Scholarship
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1969, a third federal court specifically rejected the deHaas reasoning
since the Supreme Court disfavored "judicial attempts to fashion new
rules of contribution" without an explicit Congressional sanction, absent
in section 10 (b).141
The case of Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc. (Globus 11)142
again provided the seminal analysis of postjudgment proceedings after
Globus I had found the underwriter, the issuer, and the issuer's presi-
dent liable for violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act 43 and
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.'4 Globus I refused to enforce an
indemnity agreement as contrary to public policy.1'" The underwriter
then paid the full amount of the judgment and sought contribution from
the issuer and its president. On their refusal the underwriter moved for
a judgment assessing each for one-third of the amount recovered by
plaintiffs, plus interest. 4
In an opinion adopted by the Second Circuit, the trial court granted
the motion, based exclusively on federal law.147  The court relied on
three major arguments. First, it noted the "general drift of the law...
toward the allowance of contribution among" tortfeasors.'" Second,
the court found the explicit contribution provisions in the specific
liability sections a persuasive analogy.149  Finally, and most critically,
indemnification under any construction of the facts, it nevertheless held that the third-
party complaint stated a claim for contribution. 286 F. Supp. at 815.
140. 286 F. Supp. at 815-16.
141. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49
F.R.D. 202, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The district court was referring to a Supreme Court
maritime case, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282,
285 (1952), which has since been considerably limited by Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1975). See also Note, Globus: A Prolific Generator
of Nice Questions, supra note 15, at 915-16 (courts misread Halcyon when they cite it
for proposition that federal law denies contribution between tortfeasors). The court in
State Mutual was also concerned that the New York contribution rules precluded contri-
bution because plaintiff had not joined the third-party defendants as defendants and that
the third-party defendants were judgment proof.
142. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a!f'd
per curiam on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941
(1971). (Globus l).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
144. See notes 96 & 97 supra and accompanying text.
145. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
146. 318 F. Supp. at 957.
147. See id. at 958 n.2.
148. Id. at 957.
149. Id. at 958. The court quoted deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co. and analogized
to the specific liability provisions of the securities acts; permitting contribution under
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an implied right to contribution would "'encourage diligence, investiga-
tion and compliance with the requirements of the statute by exposing
issuers and underwriters to the substantial hazard of liability for com-
pensatory damages.'"1o Indemnity would allow guilty parties to es-
cape payment and thus "dilute the deterrent impact of the securities
laws;"' 5r1 contribution would prevent such dilution, 2 since guilty par-
ties could not "effectively nullify their 'liability for compensatory dam-
ages' by leaving the whole of the burden to the more prompt and
diligent party with which they have been cast in joint and several
liability."'15 Thus, the court implied a right of contribution for liabilities
under sections 10(b) and 17(a), a right which it applied in this case
when all defendants were "equally culpable and equally responsible"''
but only one had paid the full judgment.
Globus I marked the turning point in securities contribution litiga-
tion. In every later case courts have implied a federal right to contribu-
tion. 55 Commentators, by analogy to the contribution provision in
the implied liability provisions was "simply a pertinent application of the general prin-
ciple that the two statutes are to be administered in par materia." Id. at 958. But
cf. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1961) (refusing to
imply into § 10(b) the discretionary undertaking for costs of § 18(a) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970), a specific liability provision). See generally Note,
Globus: A Prolific Generator of Nice Questions, supra note 15, at 918-20.
150. 318 F. Supp. at 958, quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1289 (2d Cir. 1969).
151. 318 F. Supp. at 958.
152. Id.; accord, Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp.
112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
153. 318 F. Supp. at958.
154. Id. at 957.
155. See, e.g., Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1365-70 (D. Md. 1975) (Se-
curities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970)); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
394 F. Supp. 946, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Securities Act §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
771(2), 77q(a) (1970); Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1970)); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974)
(Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)); Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth
United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 93,749, at 93,274
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); Exchange Act
§§ 10(b), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a) (1970)). In 1933, it was uncertain
whether those liable as controlling persons under § 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (1970), had a right to contribution under § 11(f). Douglas & Bates, supra note
35, at 179. It now seems fairly clear that controlling persons would have such a right,
at least to the extent that the controlled person has such a right. But cf. Shea v. Ungar,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,558, at 95,108 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (pre-Globus II). Since contribution rights are being implied into the primary lia-
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section 1 1 of the Securities Act,' 6 assumed that persons guilty of fraud
could not recover contribution from a person not guilty of fraud.
157
Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.158 suggests a contrary
conclusion. Although Gould denied indemnity to anyone violating
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the court found contribution avail-
able,159 specifically noting that section 14 (a) reaches both negligent and
"deliberately deceptive conduct."'160 The court carefully avoided weigh-
ing culpabiities to determine either the availability or the amount of
contribution. This suggests the court might have allowed some form of
contribution even if defendants' culpability had varied significantly. 161
V. PROCEDURES FOR ASSERTING A CONTRIBUTION CLAIM
Procedurally, there are a number of ways to claim contribution: by
cross-claim," 2 by third-party claim, 63 by separate action, 64 or by
bility sections, the rights presumably will also be implied directly into the controlling
persons sections when necessary.
156. See notes 21 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., BLOOMENTHAL § 8.27[l], at 8-82 to -83.
158. See text accompanying notes 118-21 supra.
159. 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974).
160. Id. at 167.
161. Such a case would seem to be well suited for awarding contribution according
to comparative faults. See text accompanying note 319 infra.
162. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(g). The counterclaim procedure is also appropriate under
a liberal reading of FED. R. Civ. P. 13 & 14. See Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62
F.R.D. 78, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The courts, however, have reached conflicting results.
Because a contribution claim is generally not mature when asserted as an ancillary
claim, see text accompanying note 38 supra and notes 184-86 infra, and because only
the cross-claim and third-party claim provisions expressly allow unmatured claims, some
courts have refused to allow contribution claims to be raised as counterclaims. See 3
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PA.acUcE 13.34, at 13-820 to -821 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]. For an example of the maze of counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-
party claims for contribution that can result in securities cases, see State Mut. Life
Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D. 389, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Occasionally, a series of claims for indemnity or contribution may result in a
circle of liability, with a plaintiff being assessed contribution on his own judgment re-
covery. See Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp.
240, 244 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). If defendants prevail in the main action, the third-party
claim for contribution becomes moot. Branham v. Material Systems Corp., 354 F. Supp.
1048 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Since all third-party claims and cross-claims are permissive, a
party may assert his claim in a separate action. See Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9
F.R.D. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1949). It is not clear, however, whether a contribution coun-
terclaim is compulsory or permissive. Traditionally, a claim for contribution did not
mature until a party had paid more than his share of a common liability. See note 38
supra and accompanying text. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) and 13(g) accelerate the timehttps://openschol rship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/4
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motion. 165 The underwriters in Globus Ii sought contribution by post-
when this contribution claim can be brought, but the claim itself remains contingent
until the common liability has been paid. See 3 MooRE 14.08. Because technically
the pleader has no contribution claim against any opposing party "at the time of serving
the pleading," Fmo. R. Civ. P. 13(a), the claim cannot be compulsory. Cf. 3 MooRE
14.14, at 14-336. But cf. Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). See also Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Security Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp.
326, 329 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (indemnity claim); note 162 supra.
Michigan procedure in effect makes contribution claims compulsory. Micn. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962); see In re Lady D, 416 F.2d 454, 455 (6th Cir. 1969).
Parties will generally wish to assert their contribution claims in the same action that
adjudicates their own liability. When large numbers of defendants are involved in
the same action, however, it may be more practical to withhold potential contribution
claims until after the underlying liabilities have been adjudged. See, e.g., Goldsmith v.
Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (44 defendants,
united in interest with respect to plaintiff's claim, agreed to withhold their contribution
and indemnity claims during the main litigation).
164. See Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9 F.R.D. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1949); BLOOMENTHL
§ 8.27[1], at 8-81.
165. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). The
English also use this method, entering the motion for contribution at the end of a plain-
tiff's action. See 11 HALSBURY, LWS OF ENGLAND Damages § 511, at 316 (3d ed.
1955).
The claim for contribution can also be submitted to arbitration, which may be re-
quired in controversies between members of the New York Stock Exchange or members
of the American Stock Exchange. See NYSE CONSr. art. 8, § 1, 2 CCH NYSE Guinir 1351 (1972); AMEX CoNsT. art. 8, § 1, 2 CCII AMEX Gumn 9062 (1975); Freund
& Hacker, supra note 5, at 476-77. In Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp.
766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court stayed a fourth-party action for indemnity until the mat-
ter had been submitted to arbitration. The original complaint involved numerous viola-
tions of the Securities and Exchange Acts and the causes of action in the fourth-party
complaint, like those in the third-party complaint, paralleled those in the original com-
plaint. Id. at 768. Nevertheless, because the fourth-party action was a controversy be-
tween two broker-dealer members of the American Stock Exchange and arose in connec-
tion with their business, the court enforced the agreement to arbitrate implicit in the
AMEX Constitution. Id. at 768-69, 776. Since the fourth-party action sought in-
demnity, the court stayed arbitration pending determination of the original and third-
party claims. Id. at 776. This right to arbitration may be waived by filing counter-
claims or responsive pleadings without asserting the right or by taking "advantage ofjudicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration," to the prejudice of the other
party. Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
The court in Liggett also stated that the defendant could not "be compelled to arbi-
trate his 10b-5 claim." Id. at 1046 n.8, citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether the defendant was asserting his own
claim under SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), or whether he was simply
asserting that the third-party defendant was also liable under rule lob-5 for plaintiff's
injury. In the latter situation, the contribution claim is not a lob-5 claim; inclusion
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judgment motion. This method requires a prior judgment that all
parties to the motion are liable for the plaintiff's injury, 6' so that the
motion raises no new factual issues. The court must ignore other
persons potentially liable for plaintiffs injury but whose liabilities have
not been adjudicated.' e7 Only a separate action can subject persons
with "unadjudicated liabilities" to judgment. The separate action, the
traditional method for claiming contribution, is brought after the claim-
ant has paid more than his fair share of plaintiff's claim.'6 8  For
example, if the injured party settles without litigation, those who have
paid can enforce a right to contribution by bringing an action against a
third party who unjustifiably refuses to contribute to the settlement. 169
Absent any pending action, a separate suit is necessary.170 If, however,
the injured person litigates his claim, defendants are seldom disposed to
postpone the contribution claims. A second trial after plaintiff's judg-
ment has been paid will entail substantial added expense and delay, and
may result in inconsistent verdicts based on similar or even identical
evidence.17 ' Thus, a defendant will generally want to litigate his poten-
tial right of contribution in the same proceeding in which his underlying
of such claims in agreements to arbitrate would not seem to contravene the teaching of
Wilko v. Swan.
166. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
a/I'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). Note
that a party need not be held directly liable to the plaintiff, but can be held liable for
the plaintiff's injury in a third-party action. See, e.g., Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloom-
field, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
167. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
a/I'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). The
English reach a similar result. See Maxfield v. Llewellyn, [1961] 3 All. E.R. 95, 96-97
(C.A.).
168. See 2 WILLISTON § 345, at 776-77.
169. See text accompanying note 208 infra; notes 207-08 infra.
170. Once the injured person brings suit, however, even if his claims are settled, the
action remains pending until all claims, including claims for contribution, have been
formally decided or dismissed by the court. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (nonsecurities case
in which all plaintiffs' claims settled but settling defendants' claims for contribution re-
mained for trial). In cases of partial settlement, the action naturally remains pending.
See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 165-66 (D. Del.
1974).
171. See State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D.
389, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (prejudice of separate trial within a consolidated action);
Metzger v. Breeze Corps., 37 F. Supp. 693, 695 (D.NJ. 1941). For an example of the
hardship caused by failure to use the third-party procedure, see Alabama Great S. R.R.
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 501 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1974), affd en banc per curiam, 509 F.2d
539 (5th Cir. 1975) (nonsecurities case).
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liability to the plaintiff is determined.172
This contribution claim may take the form of a cross-claim against a
person already named as a defendant in the main action,17 a third-party
claim if against a person not party to the main action, 7 4 or a counter-
claim if against an opposing party.Y7 The cross-claim raises the fewest
conceptual problems. Both parties to the contribution claim are de-
fendants in the main action; their liabilities to the plaintiff will be
determined -together; and a joint judgment will be entered if both are
172. Occasionally, though especially when there are large numbers of defendants, it
may be more practical to postpone potential contribution claims until the liabilities of
the various defendants to the plaintiffs have been determined. See, e.g., Goldsmith v.
Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
173. Ftn. R. Civ. P. 13(g). See note 162 supra.
174. In certain instances, a contribution claim against persons not already parties in
the original action may also be made by cross-claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (h) if the
presence of the additional persons is necessary for granting complete relief on the cross-
claim. See Connell v. Bemstein-Macauley, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 111, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
Note that the liberal venue and extraterritorial personal process provisions contained
in the securities acts are applicable to third-party claims for contribution because such
claims are "action[s] to enforce any liability or duty created by" the acts. Securities
Act § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970); Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
Claims for contribution fit this description in several ways. First, they are actions di-
rectly to enforce a duty to contribute, a duty expressly created by or implied under the
securities acts. See Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (refer-
ring to § 11 (f) of Securities Act). Second, they are actions indirectly to enforce a lia-
bility to an injured plaintiff, a liability created by the securities acts. Cf. id. (claim
under indemnity agreement).
If the third-party action does not meet either the liberal venue requirements of the
securities acts or another superseding venue provision, venue may nevertheless be proper
on an ancillary venue theory. In other words, if the venue in the underlying action is
proper, no independent basis for venue is required for the third-party action. See
Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (theory used
to withstand venue attack based on venue provisions of National Bank Act). Ancillary
subject matter jurisdiction and ancillary venue do not automatically confer personal ju-
risdiction over a third-party defendant. See Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330,
1369 (D. Md. 1975); Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Nationwide
personal service may be extended to ancillary contribution claims, however, on a theory
that the third-party defendant could have been served with process if joined as a defend-
ant in the underlying action or simply on a theory that the contribution claim is so
closely identified with the underlying claim that nationwide service is necessary to pro-
mote the judicial economy and convenience policies behind § 22 of the Securities Act
and § 27 of the Exchange Act. See Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., supra at 455-56 (indemnity
claim); Miller v. Hano, supra at 71 (same); cf. Wassel v. Eglowsky, supra (contribution
claims).
175. Courts disagree on whether a right to contribution may be asserted by counter-
claim. See note 162 supra.
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held jointly and severally liable. A joint judgment previously carried
special significance as a condition precedent under some statutes for a
contribution right among tortfeasors. 1 6  If the contribution right is
based on such a statute, defendants can claim contribution only from co-
defendants originally sued by the plaintiff. Absent such joinder, a joint
judgment is impossible, and no right to contribution can arise.177
It is now clear that contribution under the federal securities law does
not require a joint judgment, 178 although some litigants have contended
that Globus II imposed such a rule.179  In that case the jury had found
all parties to the contribution motion jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff, and the court declined to consider the liability of several other
persons not parties to the original suit, stating that they were "not liable
under the judgment as joint tortfeasors." 80 The courts have since
rejected this contention.18' Potential contributors must at some time be
adjudged jointly or severally liable for plaintiff's injury, but a third-party
action can render such a decision as well as the original action.'8 2 A
176. See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 228, 233-36 (1950); Comment, supra note 47, at 222-
23; text accompanying note 53 supra.
177. See Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202,
212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 3 Moopm 14.11. Note that in states requiring a joint judg-
ment a cross-claim for contribution will also fail if one of two co-defendants settles with
the plaintiff prior to judgment. See Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., supra. New York
was long known for its joint judgment requirement, which was effectively eliminated by
the Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Since that time, the New York legislature has amended its con-
tribution statutes (largely to codify Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.) and the joint judgment
requirement has disappeared. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 1401-03 (McKinney Supp.
1975), formerly ch. 388, § 5, [1964] N.Y. Laws 1256.
178. See cases cited in note 179 infra. Two other cases specifically considered and
rejected the contrary precedent provided by State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969): Herzfeld v. Laven-
thol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); State
Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,543, at 95,867 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
179. Third-party defendants have made this argument in several cases. See, e.g., Lig-
gett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Getter v.
R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
180. 318 F. Supp. at 958.
181. See cases cited note 178 supra.
182. See Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973). Al-
though courts in Globus, Getter and Liggett spoke of contribution parties as joint tort-
feasors, the essence of a right to contribution does not lie in a joint tort or joint negli-
gence but in a common liability to the injured person for the same damages, irrespective
1287
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/4
1288 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:1153
contrary result would unfairly prevent defendants from recovering con-
tribution from parties equally guilty but not originally sued by plaintiff,
while simultaneously weakening the enforcement policies of the securi-
ties acts by permitting some violators to escape liability.188
In both cross-claim and third-party actions, a party claiming contribu-
tion asserts a right not technically in existence, since payment of a
disproportionate share of a common liability is a prerequisite to contri-
bution. 84 This accelerated consideration of the contribution claim,
however, permits a single action to resolve both initial liability and
subsequent contribution, thereby avoiding duplicative judicial proceed-
ings and inconsistent results. 185
The increase in judicial efficiency has its costs. First, it creates
problems in deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run on a
contribution claim. The traditional view is that the statute does not run
until the right accrues, which, depending on the state, is when the
person seeking contribution pays a disproportionate share of the under-
lying claim, when that underlying claim is discharged, 80 or when
judgment is entered on that claim.18 7  According to this view, the
statute will not even have begun to run when the cross-claim or third-
party claim is filed.'8 s
of the ground on which each person's liability rests. See Guillard v. Niagara Machine
& Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1973); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 280 F.2d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1960). The courts may have been using "joint
tortfeasors" in the broad sense of all persons jointly or severally liable to the same per-
son for the same harm without regard to whether the tortfeasors acted in concert. See
REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886A(1), Comment b at 199 (Tent. Draft No.
16, 1970); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFASORS ACT §§ 1, 2(1) (1939 ver-
sion). See also UNioRm CoTrnMtUnoN AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr § 1(a) (1955 ver-
sion) (permitting contribution among persons "jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury").
183. See cases cited in note 179 supra.
184. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp.
112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Metzger v. Breeze Corps., 37 F. Supp. 693, 695 (D.N.J.
1941); cf. Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (indemnity).
The counterclaim similarly accelerates the time when contribution claims can be
brought. See generally 3 MooRE 1 14.08.
186. See Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 867, 875-77 (1974); note 38 supra and accompanying
text. Note that the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim is irrele-
vant. See Annot., supra.
187. See UNIFORM CoNIUnoN AMONG TORTFEASORS AT § 3(c) (1955 version);
Annot., supra note 186, at 880-81.
188. There may be a statute of limitations problem if numerous suits have been
brought, based on a single series of events. For instance, an underwriter subjected toWashington University Open Scholarship
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The second cost of including the contribution issue in the original
action by means of cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim is an
increase in the complexity of the litigation. Juries may be unable to
comprehend the added issues raised by contribution in already compli-
cated factual situations. 89 A partial solution is to consolidate the
claims at the pleading stage, thus allowing coordinated pretrial discov-
ery, then order separate trials on some of the issues. 90 Separate trials,
however, encounter the deficiencies of separate suits: "needless repeti-
tion of the same evidence"'' and severe prejudice to a contribution
claimant subjected to differing verdicts on the same facts. 192 Thus, in
one securities case the court refused, despite a confusing array of claims,
to order a separate trial of a complaint by the original plaintiff against a
third-party defendant; separate trials would have "severely prejudiced"
that third-party defendant "in a bona fide claim for contribution."' 93
The statute of limitations problem assumes greater importance when
the contribution claim is the subject of a separate action. The difficulty
several suits arising from the same misleading prospectus may quickly settle one suit.
If he is later sued by a different plaintiff, he may wish to cross-claim for contribution
toward his settlement with the first plaintiff. If the interval between the two suits is
lengthy, the statute may have run before the cross-claim can be filed. The counterclaim
of the third-party defendant in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), might have presented such a situation had the
third-party defendant sought contribution for amounts paid in settlement of § 10(b)
claims against it rather than suing under § 10(b) as an assignee of the original pur-
chasers.
189. Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,749, at 93,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,810, at 95,761 (D.
Md. 1966); cf. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63
F.R.D. 389, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see, e.g., Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United Corp.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 93,749, at 93,274-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). But cf. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 91,810, at 95,761 (D. Md. 1966). See also In re Four Seasons Securities
Laws Litigation, 361 F. Supp. 636 (Jud. Pan. Multi. Lit. 1973) (power of judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation to transfer a third-party claim or the entire action to another
district for coordination and consolidation of pretrial proceedings with other actions
pending in transferee district). Consolidated pretrial proceedings can also be ordered
for separate actions to promote efficiency. See, e.g., Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521
F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975) (17 private securities cases consolidated for pretrial proceed-
ings).
191. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D.
389, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
192. See id. at 393-94.
193. Id. at 394.
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is deciding what limitations period applies. Although few courts have
considered the issue, it seems clear that the limitations provisions con-
tained in the securities acts do not apply to contribution actions. Even
section 13 of the Securities Act, covering all liabilities created under
sections 11 and 12,194 has been held inapplicable to a contribution claim
brought under section 1 1(f) of the Securities Act.19
Absent a federal limitations period, the courts will probably look to
statutes applicable to similar state claims,196 a reference employed in
private actions brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.10 7
Since most states lack a statute of limitations specific to contribution,
194. Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970). Section 13 requires that § 11
actions be brought "within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the
omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence" and "[i]n no event . . . more than three years after the security was bona
fide offered to the public."
195. Section 11(f) is quoted in text accompanying note 21 supra. In Lyons v. Mar-
rud, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 92,307, at 97,456-
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), third-party plaintiffs sought contribution under § 11(f). The
court, however, spoke of contribution in terms of subrogation to the rights of the obligee
(there, plaintiff). As long as the primary action under § 11 was "timely brought," the
derivative right of contribution would not be barred by § 13 and could be adjudicated
in the same lawsuit. Id. at 97,457. The opinion in Metzger v. Breeze Corps., 37 F.
Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1941), although poorly reasoned, also declined to dismiss a contribu-
tion claim under § 11(f) that was untimely under § 13. See 3 Loss 1739-40. In Mad-
igan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974), the court refused to dismiss a
claim for contribution and indemnity for damages sought by a defrauded investor in a
separate action. The plaintiff in Madigan had no mature contribution claim; not yet
held liable to the investor, Madigan would be ineligible for any contribution if the in-
vestor's initial allegations were proved. The court recognized, however, that the original
action might produce a result appropriate for contribution or indemnity. Were the con-
tribution action dismissed, therefore, "unresolved statute of limitations issues" might sub-
sequently bar a meritorious claim. Id. at 238.
Specific statutes of limitations in state securities laws may be similarly inapplicable
to contribution claims for amounts paid in discharging state securities liabilities. Cf.
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Standford, 486 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1973) (in action by securities
dealer against his surety to recover on "blue-sky bond" that all dealers were required
by state law to post, Oregon securities statute of limitations held inapplicable because
dealer's liability had already been reduced to judgment and because bond constituted a
contract governed by statute of limitations for contracts).
196. See Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972); 2 MooRE
3.07[2] (2d ed. 1975); 3 Moons % 14.09 (2d ed. 1974).
197. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1970).
There are numerous commentaries on the statutes of limitations applicable to private
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions. See, e.g., Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Ap-
plicable to Private Acts Under SEC Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo.
L. REv. 165, 171 (1974).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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courts use the period applicable to implied contracts, reasoning that
contribution is a form of implied contract. 9 " That period, however, is
usually lengthy; it combines with the traditional rule on when the statute
begins to run to effectively foreclose any reliance on the statute of
limitations to preclude stale claims.' 99
The equitable doctrine of laches is a more effective device, at least for
cross-claim and third-party claims. The court has discretion to refuse to
hear these claims; 200 unexcused delay in filing such a motion is a
common ground for its rejection.20' Since the expense and delay
attendant on a separate suit makes cross-claims or third-party claims
preferable alternatives, 20 2 the danger of stale securities contribution
claims is probably insignificant.
198. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 201 N.W.2d
758 (1972); see Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 927, 931 (1974). Courts have long stated that
contribution is based on an implied promise of each party to pay his share of a common
liability, especially a contract liability. See, e.g., Batard v. Hawes, 118 Eng. Rep. 775,
778 (Q.B. 1853). It is more difficult to imply a promise by a tortfeasor to contribute,
although the promise may be implied by law on a theory of unjust enrichment. See
Leflar, supra note 39, at 136-37; Comment, supra note 47, at 217-18.
199. If the statute does not begin to run until the original claim is resolved, claim-
ants can sue for contribution over a long period. Yet it would obviously be unfair for
the statute of limitations to terminate a claimant's right to contribution before his origi-
nal liability is established. The 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act § 3(c), (d) creates a one-year statute of limitations for contribution ac-
tions, commencing with the date of final judgment against the tortfeasor seeking contri-
bution or, if no final judgment, the date the tortfeasor paid the common liability, pro-
vided he paid within a prescribed period. The statute of limitations is most likely to
arise in a separate action. The statute might successfully be invoked if defendant settles
part of the securities claims against him and then does not claim contribution for the
amount paid until, after years of pretrial discovery and appeals, all of the parties' secu-
rities liabilities have been determined. See note 188 supra.
200. See B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
3 MooRE 14.05.
201. See Connell v. Bernstein-Macauley, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 111, 116-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEC. L.
REP. 91,810, at 95,761 (D. Md. 1966); cf. Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United
Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,749, at 93,274 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (filing of claims permitted where delay partially due to court).
202. See Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 3 MOORE
14.06; cf. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). A separate suit is not always undesirable, however, especially
when a large number of defendants are involved. Thus, 44 defendants in Goldsmith v.
Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeared to-
gether represented by a single law firm. They agreed to withhold potential cross-indem-
nity, and contribution claims and to toll the statute of limitations for these claims.
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VI. CONTRIBUTION WHEN THERE IS A SETTLEMENT
Many securities cases never reach trial because the parties settle their
claims during the long pretrial period.203 Settlements often do not
resolve all claims; some defendants refuse to settle and the plaintiff
releases only the settling defendants, retaining his claims against the
nonsettling defendants.20 4  In such cases, plaintiff must decide whether
to continue or dismiss the suit against nonsettling as well as settling
defendants. The choice depends heavily on the financial rewards of
continued litigation. 20 5 If plaintiffs added cost in continuing the suit is
not significantly less than the anticipated recovery, dismissal is likely.
But if the unrecovered damages are large, plaintiff will pursue his action
against the nonsettling defendants.20 Either prospect poses serious
problems of contribution. 20 7
The source of the problem is not the lack of a trial and judgment, for
203. See, e.g., Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (class
action settlement); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Although some believe that § 29(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970),
makes any final settlement of securities claims void as a matter of law, the general view
is that § 29(a) proscribes only setttlements that allow continuing violations or waive
future violation claims, not settlement of matured claims. See Korn v. Franchard Corp.,
388 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
204. The once-universal rule that release of one wrongdoer automatically released all
others liable for the same wrong has been abandoned in most states. See Comment,
supra note 47, at 237-38. See also cases cited in note 248 infra (federal law versus state
law question on effect of release).
205. See Freund & Hacker, supra note 5, at 477.
206. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 362 F. Supp. 771 (D. Del.
1973); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FD. Suc. L. REP.
93,525 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
207. If a settlement is signed by all parties, there should be no contribution problem
because the settlement will normally provide the amount to be paid by each person; if
it does not, the settlement amount would represent a joint contract obligation of all the
defendants. If one defendant paid more than his share, he could recover contribution
from the other defendants simply by proving that they were jointly liable with him under
the terms of the settlement agreement.
To obtain contribution from a person not a party to a settlement agreement, the claim-
ant must establish the liability of the contribution defendant to the injured party, his
own liability to the injured party, and the reasonableness of the settlement amount. See
Freund & Hacker 477 n.91; Gregory, supra note 38, at 386, 391; Comment, supra note
47, at 223-24. It is important that the contribution claimant's settlement not be consid-
ered a voluntary payment. See Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 501 F.2d
94 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd en banc per curiam, 509 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1975); 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAwms, Tim LAW op ToRTs § 10.2, at 718 (1956). But cf. Kohr v. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975) (court determination that settlement amount is reasonable is sufficient).Washington University Open Scholarship
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generally those are not prerequisite to a contribution recovery; s08 it is
the absence of a discharge of a common liability of contribution claim-
ant and potential contributor.y 9 If C has a $1500 claim against both A
and B, which B settles in full for $1200, B can recover contribution
from A because his payment discharged A's liability as well as his own.
The difficulty arises when B's payment does not legally discharge A's
liability. C may then proceed against A for the rest of his claim. If he
chooses not to pursue his claim against A, B's payment has in effect
extinguished the $1500 common liability. In such a case, B should be
able to recover contribution from A. 210
If C does pursue his claim against A, B cannot in most states recover
contribution;21' legally, A has received no benefit from the settlement.
Since plaintiff can recover only the amount of his injury, however, 12 A
may acquire practical benefit from the settlement. If C obtains a $1500
208. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(a) (1955 version);
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs ACT §§ 1, 2(1) (1939 version); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(1) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). Some states,
however, make judgments a condition precedent-notably those states requiring joint
judgments. See note 176 supra and accompanying text. Other states require only a judg-
ment, not a joint judgment, which may be satisfied by a court order, entered upon a set-
tlement, dismissing the claim with prejudice. See Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States,
283 F. Supp. 14, 25-31 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (Texas law).
209. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(d) (1955 version);
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2(2) (1939 version); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(2) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); Gregory, supra note
38, at 391.
210. Cf. Freund & Hacker, supra note 5, at 477. There is little case law on this
point, perhaps because C would normally agree to accept the $1000 as full payment if
he did not intend to pursue the claim against A. Even if C is undecided, B could
preserve a contribution right by providing that the settlement agreement would release
both A and B from liability if C did not pursue his claim against A within a fixed period
of time. Should C obtain a small settlement from A, say $50, in lieu of pursuing the
action, the question becomes more difficult. If such a result is foreseeable, B should
preserve contribution rights against A by paying a slightly higher amount in settlement
and discharging the liability of both A and B.
211. E.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 15-108(c) (McKinney Supp. 1975); UNIFORM CONTRInUTION AMONG TORT-
FEASORS ACT § l(d) (1955 version); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
ACT § 2(3) (1939 version); Gregory, supra note 38, at 391; Thode, Comparative Negli-
gence, Contribution Among Tort-feasors, and the Effect of a Release-A Triple Play
by the Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 406, 429-30.
212. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170 (D. Del.
1974); Comment, supra note 47, at 243-44 & nn.150-52. Although punitive damages,
if recoverable, are added to the amount of injury, those persons claiming under the Ex-
change Act are restricted to recovery of "actual damages." Exchange Act § 28(a), 15
U.S.C. I 77bb(a) (1970).
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judgment against A, B's $1000 settlement payment will in most states be
credited against the judgment.213 A's liability is thus limited to $500,
considerably less than his share if A and B were equally responsible for
C's injury. Nonetheless, the general view prevents B from recovering
contribution since the settlement did not discharge A's liability.
The settlement does, of course, save the expense of further litigation. 1 4
To the extent the excess payment represents simply a desire to buy one's
peace, the inability to recover contribution is not inequitable. But the
litigious defendant always has the potential of a windfall. The public
policy in favor of settlement 2 5 is hardly encouraged by enriching the
defendant who goes to trial at the expense of the settling party. Settle-
ment is necessarily a speculative bargain; yet, equitable principles would
dictate that parties should recoup windfall gains which their settlement
has provided to other defendants. 210
In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 217 after plaintiffs
obtained judgment, the settling defendants attempted to recover contri-
bution. The court apparently accepted the principle of such contribu-
tion in proper circumstances but denied contribution since the claimants
had not persuasively shown they had assumed a disproportionate bur-
den. 218
213. This is the result under both uniform acts. UNIFORM CONTRIBUnON AmONO
TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(a) (1955 version); UNIFORM CONTRlMMUTON AMONG TORTFEAS-
oRs ACT § 4 (1939 version). There is disagreement whether the amount credited
should be the amount paid or the pro rata share of the settling party. See Rose v. Asso-
dated Anesthesiologists, 501 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 885(3), comment e (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970); Comment, supra note 47,
at 243-45; Note, Settlement in foint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 486 (1966).
214. See J. McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary (1974) to N.Y. CIv.
PRuc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney Supp. 1975) and Practice Commentary (1974) to N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
215. See, e.g., Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
216. But cf. Rose v. Associated Anesthesiologists, 501 F.2d 806, 810 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (malpractice suit in which settlement agreement protected settling defendants
from risk of contribution liability and therefore settling defendants could not equitably
obtain contribution from nonsettling defendants when settlement amount turned out to
be greater than their proportionate share). What is equitable is not always so clear.
If both A and B were equally responsible and both had litigated their defenses and had
been adjudged liable to C, equal shares might be an equitable result. But, when A has
incurred litigation expenses while B has incurred a lesser amount in settlement costs,
perhaps these amounts should be considered.
217. 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974).
218. Id. at 171-72. One difficulty is proof of plaintiff's total damages if the judgment
reflects a lesser amount. Thus, in Gould the court found that the plaintiff class's totalWashington University Open Scholarship
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Whether federal courts will permit a settling defendant to recover
contribution from a nonsettling defendant may depend on the parties'
rights when the situation is reversed and the latter has paid a dispropro-
tionate share. The terms of the release given to the settling party may
be dispositive of those rights. Under the 1939 Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, a settlement does not release a co-defendant
from liability for contribution unless it expressly provides that plaintiff's
claims against remaining defendant are reduced by the settling party's
proportionate share of the damages.219  Absent such a provision, plain-
tiff's damages are reduced by the amount stipulated or the amount actu-
ally paid for the release, whichever is greater, and the settling party re-
mains liable for contribution. 220 In contrast, the 1955 Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that a release "given in good
faith" automatically terminates the defendant's liability for contribution
to any other tortfeasor.22" These persons remain liable to the plaintiff for
the full amount of his damages, less the amount stipulated in the release
or the amount actually paid.222 An intermediate approach would auto-
matically reduce plaintiffs claim by the released defendant's proportion-
ate share of the damages, regardless of the amount paid.223 Thus, if C
damages had not been established and that, had all defendants remained in the trial, ad-
ditional damages might have been awarded. id. Awards of prejudgment interest and
attorneys' fees further cloud the question. Another, perhaps more difficult, problem is
proof that the settlement exceeded the proportionate share of the settling defendants.
The court in Gould did not feel that equitable considerations required decision on which
theory of damages applied to the settling defendants. Id. That was the settling defend-
ants' burden; they must produce "persuasive evidence that, in light of the judgment...
the amount expended . . . in settlement [was] in excess of [their] appropriate share."
Id. at 172.
219. UNIFORM CoNTRrrurIoN AMONo TORTFBASORs ACT § 5 (1939 version); see
Gregory, supra note 38, at 392-93; cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-43 (Supp. 1975), dis-
cussed in Thode, supra note 211, at 431-33 (containing additional requirement that pro-
portionate fault issue be litigated between defendants in order to relieve settling defend-
ant from contribution liability).
220. UNIFORM CONTUBUTnON AMONG TORTFFASORS ACT §§ 4, 5 (1939 version).
221. UNIFORM CoNTRIuTrION AMONG TORTFEAsOES AT § 4(b) (1955 version).
222. Id.
223. This rule has been followed in the District of Columbia, Louisiana, New Jersey
and Texas. See Turck, supra note 40, at 23, 31-32; Note, supra note 213, at 487-88,
492-93; Comment, supra note 75, at 335-40. See also Rose v. Associated Anesthesi-
ologists, 501 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (when settlement amount in malpractice case
was greater than settling defendants' proportionate share and nonsettling defendant was
found solely liable for plaintiffs injury, nonsettling defendant allowed credit for settle-
ment payment to extent of settling defendants' proportionate share). The proportionate
shares in these four states are usually determined by dividing the total amount of the
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settle with B, whose proportionate share is $750, Cs claims against all
other defendants would be reduced by $750 even if C received but $500
from B. This approach obviates any need for contribution since non-
settling defendants would never pay more than their proportionate share
of the common liability.
Each approach has flaws. The 1939 Act serves the equitable princi-
ples of contribution while allowing plaintiff to recover his full claim,2 24
but at the price of discouraging settlements by not fully releasing settling
defendants.22 5 The 1955 Act, on the other hand, promotes settle-
ments, 226 but has met considerable resistance from commentators who
find it unfair to nonsettling defendants and productive of collusive
settlements.227 The third approach subjects no defendant to more than
his proportionate share of damages, and guarantees a complete release
to those who settle; the victim, however, is the original plaintiff who
cannot collect his full claim unless all defendants pay their proportionate
share. The third approach is probably the most equitable to all parties
since the only one not fully protected, the plaintiff, can recover his full
damages by refusing to settle and proceeding to trial. Most pretrial
settlements award less than full damages to plaintiff; the lower recovery
is offset by the certainty of immediate payment.228
injury by the number of tortfeasors, but this reduction method can also be used with
other methods of determining contribution shares. For example, a reduction method
based on comparative fault has been judicially adopted in Wisconsin, see Pierringer v.
Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 191-93, 124 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (1963), and also in the Virgin
Islands, see Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1967); Slain, supra note
15, at 315. New York has by statute adopted a somewhat similar method, providing
for reduction by a settling defendant's "equitable share." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-
108(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975); see N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT ON
CrVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES A-30 to -33 (1974), reprinted in McKINNEY'S SESSION
LAw NEws OF NEW YoRK, March 10, 1974.
224. See Gregory, supra note 38, at 392-93; Note, supra note 213, at 492.
225. See Comment, supra note 47, at 239-40; Note, supra note 213, at 492.
226. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTEAsORs Acr § 4, Commissioners'
Note subsection (b) (1955 version); Thode, supra note 211, at 433.
227. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 47, at 240-41; Note, supra note 213, at 492; cf.
Slain, supra note 15, at 313-15 (1939 Act provision preferable for a federal contribution
rule in antitrust private suits). But see Comment, supra note 75, at 341-42. To prevent
collusive settlements, the 1955 Act requires that the release must be given "in good
faith" in order for the release to discharge contribution liability. Lack of good faith,
however, may be difficult to prove. See Turck, supra note 40, at 31-32. But cf. Com-
ment, supra note 75, at 340-41. Few states have adopted the 1955 Act. See Coccia,
Getting Others to Assume or Share the Loss: A Discussion of Indemnity and Contribu-
tion, 17 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 179, 188 n.5 (1973).
228. See Comment, supra note 47, at 241-42. Most courts will reduce plaintiff'sWashington University Open Scholarship
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Each approach strikes a different balance between the inconsistent
goals of encouraging settlements, allowing full recovery, and achieving
an equitable distribution of liability. In personal injury claims the
primary goal is affording plaintiff a full and speedy recovery. Since
clogged state court dockets may prevent a speedy jury trial, the 1955
Act encourages settlements in personal injury claims.229  The uneven
distribution of liability among settling and nonsettling defendants is less
important than assuring prompt payment of a plaintiff's hospital and
medical bills. Compensating an injured plaintiff is not necessarily the
primary goal of securities law. Rather, its goal is regulatory: to
promote enforcement, to deter negligence, and generally "to encourage
diligence, investigation and compliance" 230 with the statutory require-
ments "by providing a penalty for those who fail in their duties. 2 31
Exposing those persons responsible for a securities violation "to the
substantial hazard of liability for compensatory damages" 232 furthers
this purpose. Compensating a defrauded investor is a means to that
end, but the distribution of damages is as important as compensation.233
Thus, a particular contribution approach appropriate for personal injury
claims may incorrectly balance securities law goals.
In recent years, several federal courts have considered the effect of a
partial settlement in a securities case on a nonsettling defendant's right
to contribution from the settling defendant. None have accepted the
proposition that a settlement can absolutely bar a nonsettling defend-
ant's right to contribution. In Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp.,3 4 the
court expressly disapproved a proposed partial settlement between the
plaintiff class and three defendants which barred the nine nonsettling
defendants from prosecuting indemnity or contribution claims against
claim against nonsettling defendants by the amount of the settling defendants' payment,
in order to prevent double recovery. Id. at 243-44. But see Rose v. Associated Anes-
thesiologists, 501 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
229. See Slain, supra note 15, at 313-14; cf. UNIFORM CoNTRMUTON AMONG TORT-
FEASORs Acr § 4, Commissioners' Comment (1955 version).
230. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1289 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
231. Id. at 1288.
232. Id. at 1289.
233. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D. Del. 1974)
(paraphrase) (court discussing purposes of Exchange Act § 14(a)). "'T'he Securities
Act is more concerned with prevention than cure." Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
418 F.2d 1276, 1289 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
234. 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the settling defendants. 235  The court recognized that its decision was
contrary to the general policy favoring settlement,280 and it thought the
settlement fair and reasonable to the plaintiff class.287 The court none-
theless believed that the clear federal right to contribution in securities
cases potentially available to the nonsettling defendants could not be
justly barred at an early stage in the litigation.288
Gould presented the same issue at a later stage after damages had
been assessed at trial against the nonsettling defendants.23 Both the
settling and the nonsettling defendants claimed contribution from each
other. Since the court found neither group entitled to recover, it
avoided the issue, simply terming the question "perplexing. '240  The
same issue arises if plaintiffs separately sue two groups of defendants on
the same basic claim, then settle part or all of one suit. If defendants in
the second suit join parties to the first as third-party defendants and
claim contribution, those who have settled may raise their settlement as
a bar. Federal courts have so far rejected this defense in securities
cases, holding in one case that defendants without notice of settlement in
235. Id. at 625. See also Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 53 F.R.D. 78 (N.D. Ga.
1971). In Wainwright, an antitrust action, the court also refused to approve a class
action settlement conditional on a court order that the settling defendant not be liable
for contribution to the nonsettling defendants. The court concluded that it lacked au-
thority under Fmn. R. Civ. P. 23(e) to issue such a declaration in a class action settle-
ment; furthermore, a declaration of rights about a contingent contribution claim would
be an advisory opinion. Id. The Altman court disagreed with both grounds. It thought
Rule 23 inapplicable to contribution, while finding that the nonsettling defendants' po-
tential right to contribution was substantial enough to warrant adjudication. See 54
F.R.D. at 623, 625.
236. 54 F.R.D. at 625. The parties reaching the settlement contended that the 1955
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act represented the modern approach, but the
court noted that the Act did not "apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obliga-
tion." UNIFORM CoNrIUTnoN AMONG ToRTEAsons Acr § I(g) (1955 version).
Since the court viewed lob-5 violations as breaches of trust, it found the "modem policy"
inapposite. 54 F.R.D. at 624.
237. 54 F.R.D. at 622-23. The settlement paid more than 25 percent of all known
claims of the class, and the nine nonsettling defendants remained liable for the balance.
Id. at 622.
238. Id. at 625. The court observed that if all parties eventually settled, "differ-
ent considerations" would apply; the court would then approve a settlement provision
barring contribution. Id. This statement may have reflected the general view that a
settling defendant cannot recover contribution from one whose. liability is not extin-
guished by the settlement, see note 211 supra and accompanying text, or the court may
have considered that the nonsettling defendants would not later agree voluntarily to pay
an amount greater than their proportionate share of the total damages.
239. 387 F. Supp. at 166, 169-71.
240. Id. at 171 n.21.Washington University Open Scholarship
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another lawsuit cannot thereby be prejudiced,241 and in another that
local law preserved the contribution right.242
The latter case, Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co.,243 is the only case to resolve the settlement issue by state law. In
Alexander & Balwin, the settlement provided that New York law was
to govern, -2 14 and the court applied that law without considering the
prospect that federal law might control.245  But if the right to contribu-
tion in a federal securities case is a creature of federal law, as Alexander
& Baldwin expressly recognized, 2 " federal law should also determine
the effect of settlement on that right. The Altman court recognized this
proposition:
[Flederal law is or should be controlling on issues of [contribution]
. . . . Both Globus and deHaas make it clear that this right to con-
tribution is federal and principles of state law regarding contribution
ordinarily are not to be considered .... 247
The effect of a settlement and release on contribution forms part of the
content of that right.248  To have that right barred by state law without
241. Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In
the first lawsuit, the settlement was expressly without prejudice to the cross-claims of
the nonsettling defendants. Id. Logically, then, persons not even parties to the first
suit should not be prejudiced by the settlement.
242. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230,
239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
243. 385 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
244. Id. at 233, 239.
245. Id. at 239-40. Even under New York law, the case is anomalous. Before
1972 New York did not preserve contribution rights against a settling defendant, a sys-
tem it reinstated for all releases executed after September 1, 1974. See Short v. Thygie-
sen, 82 Misc. 2d 786, 370 N.Y.S.2d 451 (Sup. Ct. 1975); N.Y. GEN. OnLIG. LAW § 15-
108 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. STATE JuDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 223, at
A-30 to -32. The nonsettling New York defendant need not recover contribution,
however, since the new law requires plaintiff to reduce his claim against the nonsettling
defendants by the amount stipulated in the release of the settling defendants, the amount
actually paid for the release, or the settling defendants' equitable share of the damages-
whichever is greater. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1975);
N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 223, at A-32; cf. note 223 supra and ac-
companying text.
246. 385 F. Supp. at 237-39. Making more noticeable its failure to consider federal
law regarding defenses to that right, the court discussed at length the federal policies un-
derlying the contribution right.
247. 54 F.R.D. at 625. See generally Slain, supra note 15, at 310-16 (antitrust con-
text). For a general discussion of federal law as a determinant of the availability and
nature of a contribution remedy, see Note, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution
in the Federal Courts, supra note 15.
248. See Slain, supra note 15, at 311. Compare Stella v. Kaiser, 221 F.2d 115, 116https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/4
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regard to federal policies when a partial settlement is effected could both
lessen the deterrent impact of the securities laws and frustrate the
uniform application of those laws. 49 Federal policies here are not
ambivalent. They seek to penalize those responsible for a securities
violation in order to encourage diligent compliance with statutory re-
quirements.250 Permitting plaintiff to free a defendant from all contri-
bution claims obviously promotes settlements, but the cost in terms of
federal policies may be too great. In effect, the result may be the same
as when no right of contribution exists and a plaintiff sues only one of
several wrongdoers 251 or collects his judgment from only one of several
defendants held liable: plaintiff is allowed to choose arbitrarily who will
bear the burden of his loss. 25 2  Just as courts permit contribution to a
defendant who alone is named by plaintiff,2 53 or who alone pays a joint
and several judgment, 254 courts are also likely to permit contribution
against a settling defendant whenever equity or federal policy so re-
quires.2 55 That is, if one defendant settles for a disproportionately
small figure, he should still be liable for contribution to nonsettling
defendants forced to pay more than their share of the total liability.
Similarly, a settling party might recover contribution from nonsettling
defendants who benefit from the settlement and who would otherwise
avoid their share of the total liability.
For the settling party who wants to minimize his exposure to a
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955) (federal law determines whether release
of certain persons releases another person as well), with Kom v. Franchard Corp., 388
F. Supp. 1326, 1332 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state law apparently determines whether re-
lease of three named defendants releases all other defendants).
249. Admittedly, the federal law on contribution in securities cases remains in a con-
fused and evolutionary state. Any attempt, however, to determine which state's law
applies to a particular settlement, what the law provides, whether that law binds a non-
settling defendant with no connection to that state, whether the parties to the settlement
may choose the law applicable to their settlement, and so forth, would create chaos,
both in terms of the parties' planning and federal policies.
250. See text accompanying notes 230-33 supra.
251. See text accompanying notes 176-83 supra.
252. To the extent, however, that the settlement is the result of arm's-length bargain-
ing and is not unduly favorable to the settling defendant at the nonsettling defendant's
expense, the choice is not an arbitrary one made solely by the defendant but a choice
dependent on which defendant is willing to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiff.
253. E.g., Liggett & Myers Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
254. E.g., Globus Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
255. Cf. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170-71 (D. Del.
1974); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).Washington University Open Scholarship
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contribution claim, several alternatives are available. First, he can
attempt to anticipate plaintiffs probable damages and pay his share of
those damages in settlement. Given the pitfalls of predicting damages
that will be assessed in a securities suit,2 50 he is unlikely to satisfy either
the court or other defendants unless he pays an amount greater than his
expected share. Second, he can negotiate a settlement clause that will
reduce plaintiff's total claim by a fixed percentage or fraction represent-
ing the settling party's proportionate share of the damages.5T If that
share is difficult to predict, the settlement could provide that the total
claim will be reduced by the settling defendant's proportionate share,
whatever it might be.258 Since nonsettling defendants would thus pay
no more than their appropriate share of the total liability, no right to
contribution would arise.25 9 Plaintiffs, however, are hesitant to surren-
der an indefinite amount of their future judgment; hence, this type of
settlement is more difficult to negotiate with plaintiffs than the first type
in which only the actual payment is credited against a future judg-
ment. 60 A variant of the second approach would require the plaintiff
to indemnify a settling defendant if the nonsettling defendants recovered
256. In Gould, for example, when most of the defendants settled before trial, the
court found it unnecessary to determine the plaintiff class' total damages. The court
referred generally to other possible measures of damages against the settling defendants,
discretionary allowance or disallowance of prejudgment interest, and possible allowance
of attorney's fees, then concluded that the plaintiffs had not been overcompensated. 387
F. Supp. at 172. The difficulty in determining the applicable theory of damages, total
damages, and the complex legal issues in securities suits may result in a compromise set-
tlement for substantially less than plaintiff could recover were he successful at trial. If
much a settlement is only partial, with plaintiffs preserving their claims against the non-
settling defendants, the settlement is unlikely to approach the settling defendant's propor-
tionate share of a maximum recovery; it will reflect instead the uncertainties of the case.
257. See UNniFop CoNTRi BTiON AMONG ToRTFAsoRs AcT § 5 (1939 version).
258. The court would first determine the proportionate share of the settling defendant
and then credit this amount to the plaintiff's judgment against the nonsettling defend-
ants. This assumes, of course, that the judgment represented the liability common to the
settling and nonsettling defendants. If plaintiff has a number of overlapping claims
against defendants, only part of which are asserted against all defendants, sorting out
the claims to determine a proper credit may be difficult. Cf. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc.
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (involving
a straight settlement payment without a proportionate share reduction provision).
Rather than an automatic reduction, the settlement may provide that the judgment will
be reduced only if the nonsettling defendant obtains an order or judgment for contribu-
tion from the settling party. See, e.g., Rose v. Associated Anesthesiologists, 501 F.2d
806, 807 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (medical malpractice case).
259. See N.Y. STATE JuDcIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 223, at A-32.
260. See generally Comment, supra note 47, at 241-45.
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contribution. 261  Although the last two alternatives may permit a set-
tling defendant to escape his fair share, the other defendants would not
be forced to satisfy the difference; thus, equities between defendants
would not require a contribution right against the settling defendant.
20 2
261. In effect, the agreement to indemnify for contribution recovered from a settling
party achieves the same result as a reduction of judgment or claim, with the plaintiff
ultimately responsible for the contribution amount. An indemnity clause, however, al-
lows plaintiff more flexibility. If the court orders a lower than expected contribution,
or none at all, plaintiff will gain; but if the settlement reduces plaintiff's claims by one-
third, the court is likely to follow the reduction, even if it might otherwise find the set-
tling defendant's contributive share to be less. For example, if A settles with B for
$6000 and ultimately recovers a $20,000 judgment against C, the court has a number
of alternatives. It may simply credit the $6000 to the judgment and award no contribu-
tion; C would then pay $14,000 and A would recover $20,000 altogether. Or the court
may determine that B's proportionate share is $8000, credit the $6000 settlement pay-
ment, and award C $2000 in contribution; thus C would pay $14,000 and receive $2000
contribution for a net payment of $12,000; A would receive $20,000 but must indemnify
B for his $2000 contribution to C; thus A's net recovery is $18,000. Third, if the settle-
ment specifically provides that any judgment against C will be reduced by one-half, the
court may simply reduce A's judgment by $10,000 even though it might otherwise find
B's proportionate share to be only $8000; thus C would pay $10,000 and A would receive
a total of $16,000. In all cases, B would pay $6000.
The two methods also differ procedurally. For example, under the second alternative,
the settling defendant could probably be dropped as a party, despite the objections of
the nonsettling defendant, because plaintiff now is the party wishing to minimize the
settling defendant's allocable share of the underlying liability. Compare Mielcarek v.
Knights, 50 App. Div. 2d 122, 375 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1975), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
27-43 (Supp. 1975), discussed in Thode, supra note 211, at 432-33. Under the third
alternative, the settling party could probably be joined as a third-party defendant to a
claim for contribution. Although plaintiff's interest in minimizing the settling defend-
ant's allocable share is as great as under the second alternative, the nonsettling defendant
asserts here a claim for contribution against the settling defendant, who will in turn be
indemnified by plaintiff; under the second alternative, the nonsettling defendant asserts
a claim against plaintiff for setoff or credit on plaintiff's judgment.
262. The Altman court seemed only to consider equities between the parties when
it refused to approve a settlement with a clause barring contribution claims. See text
accompanying notes 234-38 supra. Note, however, that under both the second and third
alternatives, the plaintiff must bear the "loss" if the settling defendant pays less than
his share. Under the second alternative, plaintiff's claim is reduced by the settling de-
fendant's proportionate share; his loss is the difference between the amount the settling
defendant paid and the amount he "should" have paid. Under the third alternative, the
loss is the indemnity the plaintiff pays the settling defendant, which is the nonsettling
defendant's contribution recovery from the settling defendant. The plaintiff's acceptance
of this risk is part of the consideration for the settlement.
For class actions, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) requires court approval before any dismissal
or compromise. For approval, a settlement must be fair, reasonable and adequate with
respect to the plaintiff class. See, e.g., Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FaD. Sac. L. REP. 93,525 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In assessing the settle-
ment, the court must consider this risk of loss in conjunction with the rest of the settle-Washington University Open Scholarship
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These two alternatives might also lessen the deterrent impact of the
securities laws.216 But deterrence, although the primary goal of federal
securities policy,264 is not the only consideration. Compensating in-
jured plaintiffs is also important both in its own right and as an
incentive to sue. The securities laws recognize the autonomy of the
victim of a securities violation, requiring him neither to bring suit26 5 nor
demand full compensation. Such considerations counterbalance a nega-
tive impact on deterrence that can only be characterized as minimal.266
By settling, defendant has in effect been held liable for, and paid for, his
securities violation. If the nonsettling defendant need not pay more
than his proportionate share and the settlement is substantial and negoti-
ated at arms length, a court is more likely to uphold the terms under the
general public policy favoring settlements than to find the settlement
contrary to federal securities policy.
VII. AMOUNT RECOVERABLE IN A CONTRIBUTION CLAIM
To this point this Note has assumed a party held liable for contribu-
tion must pay his proportionate share of the underlying liability, but
what is a "proportionate share"? The traditional answer is that a
tortfeasor must pay his "ratable" or "pro rata" share,2 67 defined by the
dictionary as "proportionately; according to share, interest, or liability of
ment. A provision for setoff of a fixed percentage or an indefinite portion would raise
similar problems.
263. The plaintiff's agreement to indemnify a settling defendant against contribution
liability differs significantly from a corporation's agreement to indemnify its directors.
In the latter, the corporation protects its directors from liability for their negligent or
wrongful acts. Such protection allows the directors to avoid penalties and vitiates their
in terrorem effect, intended to secure compliance with the securities acts. The settle-
ment indemnity clause, however, does not protect the settling defendant from liability
for his negligent or wrongful acts. He has already settled this liability, whether or not
his payment is ultimately determined to represent his proper share. The indemnity
clause transfers to plaintiff the risk that the settlement is insufficient, necessitating con-
tribution-which is different than assuming the underlying liability. Notably, an auto-
matic reduction clause reaches the same result as an indemnity clause. Insurance pre-
sents analogous considerations. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 230-33 supra and accompanying text.
265. See Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 318 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
266. A contrary finding would virtually condemn all settlement efforts since a major
reason for settling, from a defendant's point of view, is to avoid paying even greater
amounts that might be awarded in damages at trial.
267. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF R.ESTrruiiON §§ 81, 85 (1937) ("proportionate
share"); Gregory, supra note 38, at 372; Leflar, supra note 39, at 130.
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each. '2 8  Contribution law most commonly calculated that share by
dividing the total liability by the number of parties liable, each party
being apportioned an equal share of the liability.2 9 Thus, if three
tortfeasors are liable to A on a $15,000 claim and B, one of the
tortfeasors, pays the claim, he can recover $5000, a pro rata share, from
each of the other two. Occasionally "pro rata" in contribution means
"according to the interest or benefit," with the party who benefits the
most from the transaction that injured the plaintiff paying the most in
contribution;270 almost never does it refer to an allocation based on
fault.27'
The equal or according-to-benefit allocations are peculiarly adapted
to the business contract cases in which they originated; such allocations
are equitable in that context. 272  For example, if a director on behalf of
the corporation signs a contract later held to be ultra vires, the directors,
rather than the corporation, are personally liable for any loss. Since the
director presumably acted with the approval or assent of all directors, all
are equally responsibile for the loss; each must pay an equal share of the
damages in contribution if any one director satisfies the entire underly-
ing claim.273 The English Directors' Liability Act of 1890 logically
268. WEBssni's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1986
(2d ed. 1951). See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1820 (1971) (divided, distributed, or assessed "proportionately ac-
cording to some exactly calculable factor (as share, liability, period of time)").
269. See, e.g., PROSSER § 50, at 310; Bohlen, supra note 47, at 553; Gregory, supra
note 38, at 372; Leflar, supra note 39, at 136, 146; Turck, supra note 40, at 20. The
maxim is commonly quoted in cases that "equality is equity." See PROSSER, supra;
Leflar, supra at 136. For discussion of the differing methods in equity and at law for
determining the number of persons liable to pay contribution, see note 40 supra.
270. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTrraON § 85, comment h (1937); WILLiSTON § 345,
at 770. Partners generally are liable in contribution in the same proportion that they
share in the partnership profits. See UNIFoRm PARTNERSHmp Acr § 18(a). Sureties
whose liabilities are restricted to fixed amounts contribute in proportion to these
amounts. See WILLISTON § 1279.
271. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp.
112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); UNFoRM CONTRIBUIoN AMONo TORTFASOIs Acr § 2
(1955 version); Ruder, supra note 2, at 650. But see UNrFoRM CoNTRniMoN AMoNO
TORTFFASORS ACr § 2(4) (1939 version).
272. In the contribution-among-sureties cases, there is normally no difference in de-
gree of fault and therefore equal or proportional shares produce an equitable result.
Similarly, in a joint undertaking in which a contract is for the benefit of all and all
are liable for its breach, equal contribution shares are logical. See Batard v. Hawes,
118 Eng. Rep. 775, 777-78 (Q.B. 1853).
273. The equal liability in contribution assumes that none of the directors received
any special pecuniary advantage from the contract. As long as there was common as-Washington University Open Scholarship
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applied the same allocation methods to contribution for misleading
prospectus liabilities. The situations were analogous. All directors
were presumed to have approved or assented to the prospectus; each
would be equally responsible for any misrepresentations. Regardless of
the director's knowledge or lack of knowledge of corporate affairs, his
status as a director placed him, in the eyes of the new law, on an equal
plane with the other directors.27 4 The federal securities acts, however,
subject a much broader and more diverse group of persons to liability
for securities violations than did the original English Act. In addition
to directors, the issuers, underwriters, dealers, brokers, accountants,
other experts, and individual selling shareholders may be held liable for
a violation.275
Section 11(f) of the Securities Act, providing for contribution "as in
cases of contract" was the first express contribution provision included
in the federal securities laws.270 Professors Douglas and Bates, discuss-
ing this remedy immediately after Congress adopted the Securities Act,
thought "pro rata contribution according to the rules of law and equity
[the] only workable rule to apply" to those who had not otherwise
resolved their respective liabilities by contract.2 7 7 Furthermore,
judged by administrative expediency, this is probably as simple and
satisfactory a way to handle the matter as any. To resort to fault,
compensation, or extent of participation would be even more confus-
ing.278
Other commentators, relying on these statements as well as on common
law contract precedent, have generally assumed that the pro rata method
applies in securities cases.27 9 One federal court has endorsed this view;
sent, it is irrelevant that only part of the directors actually made the contract or did
the ultra vires act. See Ashhurst v. Mason, L.R. 20 Eq. 225, 234 (1875); F. PALMER,
COMPANY LAW 221 (14th ed. 1930).
274. For an early application of pro rata contribution to directors for prospectus lia-
bility, see Shepheard v. Bray, [1906] 2 Ch. 235.
275. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text (Securities Act § 11 liability).
276. See generally text accompanying notes 17-35 & 68-74 supra.
277. Douglas & Bates, supra note 35, at 179. These experts anticipated applying the
rule only to a "residual group" because others would have expressly contracted their lia-
bilities. Since it has become more difficult to devise liability agreements not objection-
able to public policy, express contracts (except perhaps among underwriters) will no
longer "take care of most of the cases" as Professors Douglas and Bates had supposed.
Id. But cf. ALI FED. Snc. CODE § 1418(f) (1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
278. Douglas & Bates, supra note 35, at 179-80 (footnotes omitted).
279. BLOOMENTHAL § 8.2711] at 8-81; Ruder 650. Professor Loss accepted this view
in reprinting a large segment of the Douglas & Bates discussion, see 3 Loss 1737-39,
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since the court expressly found the parties to be equally culpable,
however, the contribution shares would have been the same whether
assessed pro rata or according to relative fault.280
The pro rata method is not always simple to apply. Some persons
may be insolvent; others may not have been joined as parties to the
original suit. One party may be liable only vicariously as the principal
of a wrongdoing agent. The courts presumably will follow the equity
rule of excluding insolvent parties,2 81 and Globus II indicates that only
those parties whose liabilities have been adjudicated will be considered
in apportioning contribution.28 2  Not so easily decided, however, is the
problem of vicarious or secondary liability.283 The usual contribution
rule considers principal and agent as a single unit in determining pro
rata shares, at least when that produces an equitable result.2 4  One
court has adopted this approach in a securities case. 28 r The court found
that two parties who had sold stock to plaintiff had acted as a single
entity to injure plaintiff,28 6 while the third party, a lawyer bringing
but later changed his mind. See ALI FED. SEc. CODE § 1418(f)(2) & Comment 2
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973), section quoted in note 324 infra.
280. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md.
1975) (contribution normally on a pro rata basis).
281. See Douglas & Bates, supra note 35, at 178-79 n.30. For a statement of the
equity rule, see note 40 supra.
282. 318 F. Supp. at 958.
283. Congress, expanding upon common law agency principles, specifically provided
in the securities acts that controlling persons are "liable jointly and severally with and
to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable." Securities Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970) and Exchange Act
§ 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). Arguably, this language means that a controlling
person should be liable only for the contribution share of its controlled person and that
the controlling person should not be separately counted for contribution purposes. The
result so achieved must be carefully examined, however, in light of federal policies sub-
jecting controlling persons to securities liabilities to encourage their diligence in supervis-
ing controlled persons. See generally 3 Loss 1808-11. Counting principals and agents
as single entities for contribution purposes will not necessarily provide a fair and equi-
table apportionment in a given case. Cf. text accompanying notes 288-93 infra.
284. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRis § 886A, comment h (Tent. Draft
No. 16, 1970); Gregory, supra note 38, at 375-76; cf. U FoRM CoNTrunrroN AMONG
TORTasoRs Acr § 2(b) (1955 version) ("if equity requires, the collective liability of
some as a group shall constitute a single share").
285. Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975).
286. The court found that although both parties were present at meetings with the
plaintiff, one party was the "dominant man" in the relationship between the two parties
and therefore the second party's liability was "largely derivative." Id. at 1370 & n.76.Washington University Open Scholarship
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about the sale, had acted separately. Thus, for contribution purposes
50 percent of the liability was allocable to each entity.28 7
The situation was more complex in Gould, the defendants being two
companies involved in a merger, ten directors of one company, and five
shareholders who had received favored treatment.28 After settlements
and summary judgments, the trial determined only the liabilities of two
shareholders.2 89  The court held the two shareholders liable under
section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and ordered them to disgorge part of
the excess premiums obtained.290 In their contribution claim against
the settling defendants, these shareholders contended (1) that they
constituted a single tortfeasor for contribution purposes; (2) that there
were twelve tortfeasors in all; and (3) that their contributive share was
only one-twelfth of the total damages.2 91 Such allocation would have
been inequitable. The two shareholders had alone received over 45
percent of the excess premiums paid to favored shareholders,29 2 and the
securities violation lay in the failure to disclose fully the favored share-
holder transactions.293 On the other hand, permitting the settling de-
fendants to recover contribution according to a benefit-received formula
would have been contrary to federal securities policies, allowing full
indemnity to those directors and corporations who had not received
premiums but whose negligent or intentional nondisclosure made possi-
ble the violation.294 Counting separately each party who settled or was
held liable at trial would produce an allocation somewhat more equita-
287. id. at 1370-71. Only the first two parties had been named as defendants by
the plaintiff and were therefore the only ones liable under the judgment. When such
judgment was paid, however, 50 percent could be recovered as contribution from the
third party. Id.
288. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D. Del.
1971).
289. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 362 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Del.
1973). One shareholder was a corporation, the other a retirement plan trust.
290. Id. at 775, 778. These shareholders were liable under § 14(a) because, the
court found one of the directors of the merging corporation who had approved the
proxy statement was their agent. Id. at 774-75.
291. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170 (D. Del. 1974).
292. Id. at 171 n.22.
293. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 362 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D. Del.
1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 986-87, 997 (D. Del.
1971).
294. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 171 (D. Del.
1974). If those who received no benefits escaped liability, there would be little induce-
ment for diligent execution of securities laws duties. See also Douglas & Bates, supra
note 35, at 180 & n.33.
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ble and less contrary to securities policy.295 Yet, if damages are assessed
on a disgorgement basis and some defendants received much greater
benefits than others, an equal allocation of contributive shares seems
unfair.296
The modem method of allocating contribution in other areas of the
law seems to be based on comparative fault.291 In the past, courts
have resisted apportionment according to fault either because courts
cannot apportion fault among tortfeasors298 or because the attempt
would overburden them.299 The first objection is no longer valid, given
the large number of jurisdictions with comparative negligence sys-
tems. 300 These systems require a judge or jury to determine the relative
fault of plaintiff and defendant in order to apportion damages between
them.301 Similarly, contribution based on comparative fault requires
the court or jury to allocate fault between the defendants or the defend-
ants and third-party defendants in order to determine their respective
contribution liabilities. 2 A pretrial request for apportionment greatly
mitigates the overburden problem by allowing judge or jury to consider
fault together with other issues in the case. 0 3
295. The two shareholders and their agent director would be counted as three parties.
Since 13 parties had settled, see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp.
163, 165 n.2 (D. Del. 1974), there would be 16 parties for contribution purposes, each
party's fractional share of the total damages being 1/16th. This pro rata method of allo-
cating contribution shares encourages maximum joinder as third-party defendants of all
persons potentially liable, since the more persons found liable, the smaller will be the
contribution shares of each defendant. Cf. Ruder, supra note 2, at 651.
296. It seems inequitable that a director who merely approves a misleading proxy
statement should be liable for the same amount as a person who receives a substantial
monetary benefit from the misrepresentation. Cf. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 171 (D. Del. 1974).
297. See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1968) (tort action);
Gregory, supra note 38, at 372-75; Comment, supra note 47, at 235-36.
298. See Gregory, supra note 38, at 373.
299. See Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 903 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Turck, supra
note 40, at 28.
300. See Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 20 PRAC. LAw., Nov. 1974, at 13, 14;
Woods, The New Kansas Comparative Negligence Act-An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3 (1975). If determining relative fault is impossible, dam-
ages should be equally apportioned. See Turek, supra note 40, at 25; cf. Comment,
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: The Need for Clarification, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J.
PiAc. & PROCEDURE 75, 94-95 (1974).
301. See generally PROSSER § 67, at 434-39.
302. See N.Y. Crv. Paac. LAw § 1402 (McKinney Supp. 1975), discussed in N.Y.
STATE JUDIcLAL CONFERENCE, supra note 323, at A-25 to -26; Comment, supra note
47, at 234-36.
303. See N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2231, at A-27.Washington University Open Scholarship
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A recent Supreme Court decision in admiralty, 04 replacing equal
division of damages in collision cases3 5 with a rule allocating liability
according to degree of fault, is likely to promote comparative fault
analysis in securities cases. According to the Court, equal division in
admiralty collision cases produces a "reasonably satisfactory result" only
when fault is approximately equal,30 6 and is less likely to induce care
than comparative negligence.3 0 7 The Court was unimpressed with the
argument that an equal damages rule induces settlements through ease
of application; "facile application" does not justify inequity.308 While
the case itself did not involve contribution, 0 9 it indicates a trend toward
equitable apportionment of damages in tort cases, whether between
plaintiff and defendant or between defendants.310
A system of apportioning contribution by fault may be based on
various kinds of "fault." For example, New York's contribution appor-
tionment system is based on the relative culpabilities of the parties,31'
304. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
305. Under the equal division of damages rule, total damages are apportioned
equally among all parties "found to be guilty of contributing fault, whatever the relative
degree of their fault may have been." Id.; see id. at 402.
306. Id. at 405.
307. Id. at 405 n.ll.
308. Id. at 407-08.
309. The case involved apportionment between the plaintiff vessel owner and the
defendant of damages caused to the vessel by the concurrent negligence of both plaintiff
and defendant. The district court found that the grounding was 75 percent the fault of
the vessel's captain and 25 percent the fault of the Coast Guard for having failed to
maintain a breakwater light, but under the equal division of damages rule, it had re-
quired each party to bear half the damages. Id. at 399-400.
310. See sources cited in note 300 supra. For a number of years, only four state
statutes apportioned contribution by fault-Delaware, Arkansas, Hawaii, and South Da-
kota. In 1962 Wisconsin adopted the rule by court decision, and a number of state leg-
islatures have recently adopted fault apportionment. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d
1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); IbAHo CODE § 6-803 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIV. PRxc. LAW
§ 1402 (McKinney Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (Supp. 1975).
311. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1402 (McKinney Supp. 1975); see Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Wisconsin and the
Virgin Islands also apportion contribution by relative culpability. See Gomes v. Brod-
hurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1968); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114
N.W.2d 105 (1962). The 1939 UNIFoRM CONTRIBUTON AMONG ToRTFEASORS Acr in
§ 2(4) restricts the concept to circumstances in which "there is such a disproportion of
fault among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them
of the common liability by contribution. ... ." The Act thus retains a presumption
of equal distribution. See Thode, supra note 211, at 426, discussing UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-40(2) (Supp. 1975).
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England's on relative responsibilities of the parties for the damages, 12
and Germany's on the "circumstances."313 Importing any of these sys-
tems into securities litigation requires caution.314 Of the three, con-
tribution according to relative culpabilities may provide the least satis-
factory solution. First, section 11(f) prohibits anyone guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation from recovering contribution from anyone
not so guilty.31 Second, once fraud is proven, a court is unlikely to
distinguish between an "active" party and a "passive" party or find one
party "more liable" than another.3 16 As the court of appeals in Globus
I noted, proof that an issuer is "more liable" than another defendant will
not be difficult; 317 an issuer is "inevitably closer to the facts."3 8 Such
distinctions would produce only less diligence by underwriters, account-
ants, and directors who are not active participants in particular securities
registrations or sales.
This does not mean that apportionment according to culpability may
never be appropriate. Perhaps Professor Ruder's standard for allowing
an indemnity claim-"when the degrees of fault are substantially differ-
ent"3 19-would assist in determining when to impose contribution ac-
cording to relative culpability.
The English provision now applicable to tort liabilities in England,
including those under the company laws,320 requires the court to deter-
mine the amount of contribution according to what it finds
to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's
responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt
312. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5,
c. 30, § 6(2). The section is quoted in part in text accompanying note 321 infra.
313. See Turek, supra note 40, at 24-25. The general rule of equal apportionment
stated in the German Civil Code has become the "rare exception." Id.
314. The Seventh Circuit, in adopting a federal rule of contribution based on compar-
ative negligence for mid-air collisions, stated no limits on this rule. Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). A
single rule of apportionment, applicable to all express or implied federal contribution
rights, would seem inappropriate. Cf. Slain, supra note 15, at 311-15.
315. See text accompanying note 21 supra, quoting § 11(f). See also BLOOMENTnAL,
supra note 94, § 8.27[1], at 8-82; note 26 supra.
316. See note 116 supra.
317. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
-318. Id.
319. Ruder, supra note 2, at 655, 658.
320. Cf. 37 HALSBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND Tort 247 (3d ed. 1962); F. PALMER,
COMPANY LAW 579-80 (20th ed. 1959).
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any person from liability -to make contribution, or to direct that the
contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a com-
plete indemnity.
32 1
The English courts have experienced some difficulty in articulating the
basis for determining "responsibility for the damage," whether it be the
relative blameworthiness of the parties, the relative causative effect of
their acts or omissions, or simply one of fairness between the parties.3 2
Nevertheless, and perhaps because of this difficulty, the statute provides
more flexibility than the American relative culpability statutes. In a
securities case, for example, "responsibility for the damage" might
include consideration of the differing standards of care imposed on
various parties in addition to the considerations of blameworthiness,
causative effect, and fairness. Professor Loss has incorporated the
English approach to contribution in the Federal Securities Code3 23 by
making the "relative responsibility of each person for the loss incurred"
the major consideration in determining contribution claims. 24  In its
present form, however, the section retains all the ambiguities of the
English provision.325 Either the basis for determining "relative respon-
321. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5,
c. 30, § 6(2). The statute, however, does not "render enforceable any agreement for
indemnity which would not [otherwise] have been enforceable." Id. § 6(4) (c).
322. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Llewellyn, [1961] 3 All. E.R. 95, 96 (C.A.) (blameworthi-
ness); Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council, [1947] 1 K.B. 598, 624 (extent negli-
gence causal in bringing about damage); Daniel v. Rickett, Cockerell & Co., [1938] 2
K.B. 322, 326 (what is right as between parties, having regard to fair division of re-
sponsibility); cf. 11 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND Damages 513, at 317 (3d ed.
1955). For an application of the English statute to a case in which two groups of de-
fendants had each breached different statutory duties, see Rippon v. Port of London
Authority, [1940] 1 K.B. 858, 866-67.
323. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1418(f)(2) & Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
324. Section 1418(f) provides for allocating the contribution liability by contract and
then, in subsection (2):
To the extent that there is no such contract, and on consideration of the
relative responsibility of each person for the loss incurred, the judgment in an
action for contribution may (A) order any such person to pay to any other
such person as much as is determined to be just and equitable by way of con-
tribution, (B) order that the contribution of any such person amount to a
complete indemnity, or (C) determine that any such person is not liable to
make contribution; but no such person may be ordered to pay more under
this subsection than his maximum liability if he had been a defendant in the
action giving rise to the action for contribution.
Id. § 1418(f)(2).
325. The Federal Securities Code is still in the preliminary drafting stages. Hope-
fully, this section will receive further attention before the Code reaches its final drafting
stages.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/4
1312 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:1153
sibility. . . for the loss" should be stated, or the courts should be given
plain authority to develop a flexible test.
Gould exemplifies the flexibility required in difficult cases. Al-
though the court ultimately awarded contribution to none of the par-
ties,3 26 the basis of the decision was equitable considerations.321 7  The
court apparently focused on determining the appropriate contribution
share-what each party equitably should pay considering all circum-
stances.828 The court considered premium payments received by some
defendants, the equities between the defendants, the damage theories,
the partial settlement, and federal policies.3 29 While culpability was not
considered, there was no evidence that the defendants varied significant-
ly in fault.330 In contrast, the court in Globus 11 first found the
defendants "equally culpable and equally responsible," and then auto-
matically apportioned contribution on an equal pro rata basis.33 , Pro
rata apportionment, if simple and fair, should be used; when it produces
an inequitable result, however, the court should be free to consider
other methods.
3 32
326. 387 F. Supp. at 171-73.
327. Emphasizing the inherent equitable nature of the contribution doctrine, the court
stated that the phrase "as in cases of contract" was meant to avoid common law restric-
tions on contribution, not "to preclude equitable considerations in awarding contribution
in securities cases." Id. at 170.
328. So stated, the test sounds similar to the "according to the circumstances" test
frequently used in Germany. See note 313 supra and accompanying text. Other factors
which might appropriately be considered in some cases are financial circumstances of
the parties and the presence of insurance-factors certainly considered by the parties in
settling.
329. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170-72 (D. Del.
1974).
330. Cf. id. at 168.
331. 318 F. Supp. at 957-58.
332. Whether the contribution apportionment is for the judge or the jury to determine
may depend on the method of apportionment used. When contribution is equal pro
rata, there is no factual question for a jury once the liabilities to the injured party have
been determined. See, e.g., Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 903 n.1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(contribution appropriately reserved for court determination). If the method is compar-
ative negligence or relative culpability, proportionate fault is a factual question properly
decided by a jury. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Bohlen, supra note 47, at 568; Gregory, supra
note 38, at 374. If a settlement is involved, the trier of fact must also determine its
reasonableness. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., supra. Under the English statute,
the court apportions all contribution, but the Federal Securities Code would normally
leave apportionment of comparative fault to the jury. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1417
(f), Comment 3(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973); cf. Gregory, supra. If a complicated
case requires weighing factual issues and legal policies, the court is best equipped to re-Washington University Open Scholarship
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Flexibility creates problems of its own. To alleviate the consequent
uncertainty of allocation, parties may wish to allocate by contract their
contribution shares; they are free to do so if the contracts do not violate
public policy.333 At present, a provision for full indemnity will normal-
ly be unenforceable, as will any provision that encourages lax or negli-
gent conduct regarding securities laws duties. The uncertainty of
allocation also suggests settling defendants may have to remain parties
to a lawsuit that continues against nonsettling defendants in order to
litigate the extent of their faults, responsibilities, and equities, at least if
there is a counterclaim for contribution. On the one hand, the
presence of the settling defendants may be necessary to allocate fairly
the contribution shares.334  On the other hand, the settling defendants
may no longer care how the shares are allocated. If the plaintiff has
agreed to indemnify the settling defendants for any contribution they
must pay, or has agreed to reduce his claim by the share allocable to the
settling defendants, the plaintiff is now the real party in interest.335
Whether the settling parties must remain in the suit depends on so many
still unanswered questions that a general answer is yet impossible. Some
of the relevant questions can be listed: Does the settlement terminate
solve the question, especially if no single formula such as culpability or responsibility
can determine the outcome. When partial settlements or multiple trials are involved,
the jury is even less useful and more inefficient, because it must hear evidence regarding
culpability. Cf. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63
F.R.D. 389, 392-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
333. The ALI FED. SEc. CoDE § 1418 (f)(1) expressly provides that liable parties
"may allocate liability among themselves by contract made either before or after liability
is imposed." Allocation of liability among participating underwriters by contract is
fairly common-generally in proportion to the underwriting commitment. See Freund
& Hacker, supra note 5, at 480. See also id. at 485-94 (proposed contract provisions).
One writer proposes a contractual method for apportioning liabilities under § 11 of the
Securities Act in which the total liability would be allocated to each material error ac-
cording to the market effects of the error; this liability would in turn be allocated among
the defendants responsible for that error. Comment, Section 11 of the Securities Act-
A Proposal for Allocating Liability, 45 WASH. L. REv. 95, 116-27 (1970). Such a con-
tract, although perhaps enforceable, seems infeasible in certainty and ease of application.
Arbitrating the allocation of liabilities seems simpler than submitting the errors to in-
vestment analysts for market effect determinations; if so, parties would have little use
for such a restrictive contract, suited only to § 11 liabilities.
334. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-43(2) (Supp. 1975), criticized in Thode,
supra note 211, at 432-33 (settling defendant is not released from liability to make con-
tribution unless, among other things, "the issue of proportionate fault is litigated between
joint tort-feasors in the same action") (emphasis added).
335. See Mielcarek v. Knights, 50 App. Div. 2d 122, -, 375 N.Y.S.2d 922, 926-27
(1975); Thode, supra note 211, at 432-33.
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contribution claims against settling defendants? Does the settlement
terminate claims against nonsettling defendants by the settling defend-
ants? What bases or factors will the court consider in allocating contri-
bution shares? Is it relevant which provision of the securities laws was
violated? Is the settlement silent on contribution or does it adjust
the plaintiff's claim or provide for indemnity in the event of contribution
claims? Answering these questions will take time, and even then the
answers may vary from court to court, case to case, and defendant to
defendant.
VILI. CONCLUSION
While federal courts have become increasingly hostile to claims for
indemnification in securities suits, they have simultaneously become
receptive to claims for contribution. If the securities acts failed to
provide expressly for contribution, the courts have implied such a right.
Creating the right, however, is only a first step. How and when the
right can be claimed and what amount can be recovered are questions
the courts are just beginning to answer. Though state practices provide
some guidance, their utility is limited not only by lack of uniformity but
also by the differing purpose of contribution in a typical personal injury
suit and in a securities suit. The only guidelines in those securities
provisions expressly providing a right of contribution is the phrase "may
recover contribution as in cases of contract.. 3 (0  A narrow reading of
this language would limit courts to awarding and apportioning contribu-
tion solely as in a contracts case. More likely Congress intended to
avoid the common law restrictions on contribution in tort cases and did
not intend "to preclude equitable considerations in awarding contribu-
tion in securities cases. 3 37 The most serious problems confronting the
courts in resolving contribution claims undoubtedly lie in the area of
partial pretrial settlements. The competing considerations of promot-
ing settlements, doing substantial justice to all parties, and fulfilling the
goals of federal securities policy are most sharply contradictory in such
settlements. The number and magnitude of the unresolved questions in
this field argues strongly against the premature appearance of hard and
fast rules, and equally strongly in favor of continuing judicial flexibility
in contribution claims.
336. See text accompanying notes 21-32 supra.
337. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170 (D. Del. 1974);
see text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.Washington University Open Scholarship
